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xTh e Committee for Economic Development is an 
independent research and policy organization of over 
200 business leaders and educators. CED is non-proﬁ t, 
non-partisan, and non-political. Its purpose is to pro-
pose policies that bring about steady economic growth 
at high employment and reasonably stable prices, 
increased productivity and living standards, greater 
and more equal opportunity for every citizen, and an 
improved quality of life for all.
All CED policy recommendations must have the 
approval of trustees on the Research and Policy 
Committee. Th is committee is directed under the 
bylaws, which emphasize that “all research is to be thor-
oughly objective in character, and the approach in each 
instance is to be from the standpoint of the general 
welfare and not from that of any special political or 
economic group.” Th e committee is aided by a Research 
Advisory Board of leading social scientists and by a 
small permanent professional staﬀ .
Th e Research and Policy Committee does not attempt 
to pass judgment on any pending speciﬁ c legislative 
proposals; its purpose is to urge careful consideration 
of the objectives set forth in this statement and of the 
best means of accomplishing those objectives.
Each statement is preceded by extensive discussions, 
meetings, and exchange of memoranda. Th e research 
is undertaken by a subcommittee, assisted by advisors 
chosen for their competence in the ﬁ eld under study. 
Th e full Research and Policy Committee participates 
in the drafting of recommendations. Likewise, the 
trustees on the drafting subcommittee vote to approve 
or disapprove a policy statement, and they share with 
the Research and Policy Committee the privilege of 
submitting individual comments for publication.
Th e recommendations presented herein are those of the 
trustee members of the Research and Policy Committee 
and the responsible subcommittee. Th ey are not necessarily 
endorsed by other trustees or by non-trustee subcommittee 
members, advisors, contributors, staﬀ  members, or others 
associated with CED.
Responsibility For CED Statements On National Policy
xi
For more than a decade, both economists and observers 
of the ﬁ nancial markets have become increasingly con-
cerned at the growing and persistent trade imbalances 
in the world economy.  In something of a reversal of its 
prior role, the United States, the world’s richest nation, 
has become an international borrower, running large 
trade deﬁ cits and accumulating a substantial net nega-
tive international asset balance.  Th e U.S. trade deﬁ cits 
have reached rates that analysts in the past might have 
characterized as unsustainable.
Many factors play a role in the growth and continua-
tion of these imbalances, but none of those factors is 
clearly the sole or even the primary cause, or subject to 
easy remedy.  Furthermore, the potential ill eﬀ ects of 
persistent imbalances – protectionism, transfers from 
future generations of Americans to today’s generation, 
and ﬁ nancial instability – are all troubling.
Th e concerned members of this CED subcommittee 
– the business, academic, and policy leaders listed on 
page viii – began meeting in the fall of 2006 to con-
sider these global ﬁ nancial imbalances.  Th ey debated 
the sustainability of large and continuing U.S. current 
account deﬁ cits, and the root causes and long-term eco-
nomic consequences of today’s global ﬁ nancial imbal-
ances.  Th ere was a real concern among the group that 
the public debate might devolve to counterproductive 
policies, including protectionist steps, to address this 
issue.  Although many CED Trustees believed that the 
imbalances could be smoothly resolved through market 
forces alone, there emerged a consensus that it would 
be wise to “buy insurance” by adopting policies that 
would reduce the risks of a disorderly adjustment.  In 
the tradition of CED, the subcommittee recommends 
a set of practical, actionable policy steps for all major 
contributors to the imbalances – steps that each nation 
should want to take in its own interest and that often 
serve other important economic objectives. Th e rec-
ommendations also include ideas for an international 
process to facilitate such cooperative adjustment.
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Purpose of This Statement

1In Reducing Risks from Global Imbalances, CED traces 
the evolution of the current large global trade and 
ﬁ nancial imbalances, examines their sources, and makes 
recommendations that, if adopted, will help ensure 
continued growth in the global economy. 
Findings
• Since 1991 the global economy has become in-
creasingly “imbalanced,” as the trade deﬁ cit in the 
United States and trade surpluses in many foreign 
countries have grown rapidly.  In 2005 and 2006 
the U.S. current account deﬁ cit (which includes 
international investment income ﬂ ows and transfer 
payments as well as trade in goods and services) 
reached an unprecedented 6.1 percent of GDP.  
• Th e counterpart of these U.S. deﬁ cits has been 
large current account surpluses in the oil-exporting 
countries, Japan, China, and certain other Asian 
and European economies, which have accumulated 
extremely large private and public holdings of dol-
lar assets.  As a consequence, U.S. net international 
debt rose to 16 percent of GDP in 2006.
• Th ese global imbalances have resulted from several 
factors, including declining saving in the United 
States and high saving in the surplus countries; 
an increase in the demand for dollar assets due to 
globalization; the recent rise in energy prices; rela-
tively rapid economic growth in the United States; 
and exchange rate intervention by China and other 
countries pursuing export-led growth.
• Market-driven changes in exchange rates and the 
structure of global demand are likely eventually 
to produce an orderly adjustment of these global 
imbalances if there are no shocks to the system.  
Such an adjustment process appears already to 
have begun.  However, the process is likely to be 
slow, and the continuation of large imbalances 
poses several risks: 
Reducing Risks from Global Imbalances
Executive Summary
 Protectionist pressures are mounting in the 
United States in reaction to the trade deﬁ cit 
and, in particular, the large bilateral deﬁ cit with 
China. 
 Th e continuing growth of net debt implies 
additional transfers from younger or future 
generations of Americans to adults living 
today, which CED believes to be unwise and 
inequitable.  
 If investors and governments lose conﬁ dence 
in the ability of the United States to ﬁ nance 
continuing deﬁ cits at acceptable rates of return, 
a sharp drop in the dollar resulting in ﬁ nancial 
and economic disruption is possible.
• Th e most prudent response to these risks is to “buy 
insurance” in the form of precautionary policies 
to facilitate adjustment.  Th ese policies are gener-
ally those that countries should take in their own 
self-interest, but that may sometimes be politically 
diﬃ  cult.
Recommendations
• As a general matter, all economies should contrib-
ute to global adjustment, which will require both 
changes in relative prices (exchange rates) and a 
rebalancing of global demand.  A multilateral coop-
erative approach to adjustment is most likely to be 
successful in securing these global adjustments in 
demand and exchange rates and the political “buy-
in” needed to implement them.
• Th e United States, as the preeminent deﬁ cit coun-
try, must avoid a protectionist response.  Instead, 
it should increase national saving by eliminating 
the “on-budget” ﬁ scal deﬁ cit within ﬁ ve years.  Th is 
ﬁ scal consolidation will require comprehensive 
expenditure reductions as well as increased reve-
nues, which might best be pursued through CED’s 
recommended tax reforms or energy taxes.  Private 
2saving also should be increased through tax reform 
and targeted saving initiatives such as the adoption 
of “automatic” 401(k) plans by employers.
• Europe should pursue policies that continue to 
strengthen domestic demand, including structural 
reforms of product and labor market policies and 
supportive monetary policy.  Authorities should 
refrain from intervention to prevent further ap-
preciation of the euro against the dollar. 
• Japan also should pursue structural reforms and a 
careful balancing of ﬁ scal and monetary normal-
ization that will support growth.  Japan should 
continue to refrain from intervention or public 
statements that impede the yen appreciation that is 
needed for global adjustment.
• China should expand public consumption in 
health care, education, public pensions, and 
other programs.  Financial reforms to improve 
the intermediation of private saving would raise 
private consumption and improve the eﬃ  ciency of 
private investment.  Th ere should be a signiﬁ cant 
near-term appreciation of the renminbi against 
the dollar, in the range of perhaps 10 percent, with 
future appreciation in the range of 5-7 percent an-
nually for several years.  In the longer term, China 
should continue to gradually liberalize its capital 
account and eventually move to a largely market-
determined exchange rate.
• Th e petroleum exporters should continue to 
increase public and private investment programs to 
raise domestic demand.  Gulf Cooperation Council 
countries should consider following Kuwait’s ex-
ample in moving from a rigid dollar peg to a more 
diversiﬁ ed currency basket.
• Smaller surplus countries also have a role to 
play.  Some have accumulated very large exchange 
reserves, and in the aggregate they can make a 
signiﬁ cant contribution to adjustment.  Th ey 
should resist the temptation to be “free riders” as 
larger countries adjust.  Instead, they should allow 
exchange rate adjustment and expand domestic 
demand as their individual circumstances permit. 
• Th e International Monetary Fund (IMF) can and 
should be more proactive in catalyzing govern-
ments to consult on and implement adjustment 
policies.  Th e multilateral consultations organized 
by the IMF in 2006-2007 should be institutional-
ized in an international consultative group to be 
organized as circumstances require.
3Th e U.S. trade and current account deﬁ cits, after rising 
since 1991 to levels previously thought unsustainable, 
may have stabilized in late 2006 and early 2007.  It is 
too early to say whether they will now fall signiﬁ cantly.  
Certainly, some important features of international 
economic adjustment have emerged that might facili-
tate a drop in the U.S. current account deﬁ cit and in 
its counterparts, the large current account surpluses 
in other countries:  Th e dollar has fallen against the 
euro and some other currencies since early 2002; 
economic growth has slowed in the United States and 
strengthened in Europe and Japan; China, India and 
other Asian economies are booming; oil prices have 
stabilized, and the oil exporters are beginning to work 
oﬀ  their large petro-surpluses with major import-
increasing investment projects.
Should we therefore conclude that an orderly market-
driven unwinding of these imbalances is inevitable, and 
that “benign neglect” is the appropriate policy?  We 
believe not, after analyzing the sources of the imbal-
ances and the risks they pose for the U.S. and global 
economies.  After examining the process of adjustment, 
we acknowledge that market forces acting on global 
demand and exchange rates may well prove suﬃ  cient 
for smooth and orderly adjustment.  But we also ﬁ nd 
substantial risks for both the United States and other 
countries.
One risk arises because not all the conditions for 
market adjustment are in place.  No signiﬁ cant policy 
changes have yet been enacted to reduce the U.S. ﬁ scal 
deﬁ cit, which we believe is an important source of the 
U.S. external imbalance.  Th is poses an inﬂ ationary 
danger, and a problem for monetary policy, if the dollar 
continues to fall.  Similarly, although the euro has ap-
preciated, market exchange rate adjustment has been 
impeded in China and some other Asian economies, 
where current account deﬁ cits and reserve holdings 
from currency intervention continue to rise sharply.
I. Introduction 
Th e possibly protracted timeline of market adjustment 
poses another risk.  Forces for both trade and ﬁ nancial 
protectionism are growing, under the political pressures 
of continuing large bilateral deﬁ cits with China; this 
danger aﬀ ects other advanced countries as well as the 
United States.  Furthermore, as the U.S. external debt 
grows, resources continue to be “borrowed” from future 
generations to beneﬁ t today’s consumers – which we 
believe to be ﬁ scally imprudent.  A protracted period 
of adjustment, with continued large external deﬁ cits 
and rising external debt, also raises the danger that 
some shock to the system, or myopic investor expecta-
tions, will precipitate a break in conﬁ dence that could 
produce disorderly exchange rate changes and possibly 
economic disruption aﬀ ecting both the United States 
and other countries.
For these reasons, even if an orderly market-driven 
adjustment may be the most likely outcome, we believe 
the prudent course of action is to hedge against such 
risks by “buying some insurance” in the form of precau-
tionary policies to prepare for and facilitate adjustment. 
It is strongly in the self-interest of the United States, 
as well as other countries, to do so.  While policy 
actions need to be taken by the United States and 
other countries as well, it is essential that the United 
States exercise strong leadership in both the domestic 
and international dimensions of policy.  Domestically, 
the United States must take long overdue action to 
reduce the federal budget deﬁ cit – ﬁ rst, as a matter of 
simple self-interest; second, as part of a multilateral 
eﬀ ort to facilitate international adjustment; and ﬁ nally, 
because the credibility of U.S. international leadership 
requires that it ﬁ rst put its own ﬁ scal house in order.  
Internationally, the United States must lead simply be-
cause no major multilateral eﬀ orts can succeed without 
the United States, and (as we argue in this statement) 
the chances of success are much higher if governments 
work together rather than separately.
4Th e policy statement concludes with recommendations 
for actions – by the United States and other systemi-
cally important countries, such as China, Japan, and the 
Euro Area – that would be most helpful in facilitating 
adjustment.  Th e proposed actions would help rebal-
ance global demand and make exchange rates more 
responsive to market forces.  Th ese are generally actions 
that these countries should take in their own self-
interest, but that in some cases may be more palatable 
in a multilateral framework.  We also oﬀ er suggestions 
for extending into an ongoing process the multilateral 
consultations on adjustment that were convened and 
catalyzed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
in 2006-2007.
Finally, we emphasize that these recommendations 
are not oﬀ ered as rigid, hard-wired actions to be 
implemented in exquisitely coordinated simultaneity 
by many countries as a comprehensive program.  Th at 
would be quite unrealistic – technically, economically, 
and politically.  Our recommendations should rather be 
seen as directional objectives, likely to be implemented 
over a period of several years, with some participants 
more constrained than others by domestic consider-
ations in their policy contributions.  But we neverthe-
less believe that such an ongoing process would im-
prove on current arrangements by making it clear that 
adjustment is a collective enterprise, and by eﬀ ectively 
rewarding governments that are seen to participate in 
the program and contribute to international stability.  
Such a multilateral process will not replace bilateral 
discussions and negotiations of policy diﬀ erences, 
which may be necessary for both substantive and politi-
cal reasons.  But it may reduce some of the political 
diﬃ  culties and tensions characteristic of bilateral nego-
tiations, and the associated accusations, pleas, threats, 
and denials that often surround disagreements between 
countries on economic policies.
5II. “International Imbalances” and
Their Recent Rapid Growth 
What Are “International Imbalances?”
Th e term “international imbalances” most commonly 
refers to the diﬀ erence between the historically large 
U.S. international trade deﬁ cit (more precisely, the 
current account deﬁ cit, which includes payments for 
international investment income and transfer payments 
as well as trade in goods and services), and the cor-
respondingly large trade and current account surpluses 
of many of this nation’s trading partners.  (Globally, 
of course, the sum of all trade (and current account) 
balances must net to zero, absent measurement errors, 
which can be substantial.1)  Figure 1 shows the large 
growth in major current account imbalances since 
1990.
Th e U.S. trade deﬁ cit eﬀ ectively represents the diﬀ er-
ence between the total expenditures on and produc-
tion of goods and services, a diﬀ erence that (net of 
international income and transfer payments) must be 
ﬁ nanced by selling assets abroad.  Such sales and pur-
chases of assets over time change the net international 
investment (“balance sheet”) positions of both debtors 
and creditors.  Persistent, large current account deﬁ cits 
and surpluses tend to produce large diﬀ erences be-
tween countries in these net investment positions, and 
the term “international imbalances” is also sometimes 
used to refer to these balance sheet diﬀ erences and the 
composition of assets and liabilities that underlie them.
Why Should We Care About International 
Imbalances?
Th e term “imbalances” may carry a negative con-
notation, because it seems to imply that “balance” 
should be restored among national trade and current 
accounts and creditor/debtor positions.  In general, 
Figure 1.  Current Account Balances of Selected Countries and Regions
(Surplus (+) or Deficit (-), Percent of World GDP)
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6this is not the case, and this policy statement uses the 
term in a descriptive rather than this normative sense.  
Historically, trade imbalances have been the mecha-
nism by which creditor countries have lent resources 
to borrowing countries.  Th is is generally appropriate 
and desirable, since the returns to capital are presump-
tively higher in the borrowing countries, so that both 
borrowers and lenders beneﬁ t.  Th e United States ran 
trade and current account deﬁ cits for many years when 
it borrowed the capital from Europe to ﬁ nance its early 
development, and many other developing economies 
have borrowed in similar fashion.2  As the global 
economy grows, such resource transfers, and indeed 
capital movements in general, increase the eﬃ  ciency 
of resource use worldwide and raise global living 
standards.
In fact, the recent unprecedented growth in interna-
tional imbalances has proven very attractive for both 
the major lenders and borrowers involved.  Th e imbal-
ances have allowed traditional export-oriented econo-
mies, such as Japan and Germany, joined recently by 
China and others, to have very large export surpluses to 
stimulate growth and employment.  At the same time, 
they have permitted capital importers – preeminently 
the United States – to continually spend more than 
they produce, borrowing the additional goods and 
services from abroad.  It has been a mutually beneﬁ cial, 
even “co-dependent” arrangement.  As former Federal 
Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker has said with refer-
ence to ﬁ nancing the large U.S. borrowing, “Th ere is no 
sense of strain.  It’s all quite comfortable for us.”3  Not 
surprisingly, there consequently has been little desire 
by either individuals or governments to take actions to 
reduce the imbalances, especially since doing so (as we 
note below) would sometimes entail painful economic 
adjustments.4
We argue in this policy statement that these imbal-
ances have now become so large that they begin to 
pose risks to the economic stability and growth of 
the United States and other countries.  Th erefore, the 
process of adjustment should be facilitated by changes 
in policy that reduce these risks.  As discussed in more 
detail below, the large imbalances create at least three 
principal risks:
• Protectionism.  We fear that continuing large 
trade deﬁ cits, and in particular the very large U.S. 
bilateral deﬁ cit with China, may aid the eﬀ orts of 
domestic industries in seeking government protec-
tion from import competition.  Th is could halt, or 
even reverse, the progress towards the more free 
and open international markets that have beneﬁ ted 
United States and the postwar world.
• Financial or Economic Instability.  Th e continued 
rapid accumulation of foreign private and public 
holdings of dollar assets could lead to a collapse of 
conﬁ dence in the dollar if this accumulation were 
suddenly perceived to be unsustainable.  As noted 
below, various shocks to the system might produce 
such a change in expectations about the value of 
the dollar.  A sharp fall in the demand for dollar 
assets could disrupt ﬁ nancial markets and possibly 
aﬀ ect output and employment in the United States 
or elsewhere.
• Borrowing From the Future.  Th e rise in U.S. net 
international debt has principally ﬁ nanced an 
increase in consumption, which eﬀ ectively will be 
paid for by future generations of Americans who 
will have to service that debt.  We believe this is 
inequitable and problematic because of the likely 
costs associated with an older population, includ-
ing higher health care costs, and the costs of deal-
ing with climate change and other environmental 
problems.
Recent Trends in International Imbalances
Th e U.S. Current Account
Figure 2 shows the U.S. current account balance from 
1960-2006, as well as its components: the trade, in-
come, and current transfer accounts.i  In the 1950s and 
1960s, the dollar was ﬁ xed to gold, which the United 
i Th e deﬁ cit on unilateral transfers, which has generally run about 0.5-0.8 percent of GDP, consists primarily of private remittances and transfers and 
government grants.  Private remittances have become increasingly important as a result of continued immigration and the rise of the foreign-born propor-
tion of the U.S. population.
7States held as reserves; and most currencies were ﬁ xed 
in relation to the dollar, although these rates were 
occasionally changed if believed to be in “fundamental 
disequilibrium.”  Th e U.S. trade and current account 
balances were consistently positive, and a large surplus 
on income reﬂ ected the U.S. position as the world’s 
major creditor nation.  However, in the late 1960s, the 
U.S. trade surplus fell towards zero as trade competi-
tion from Japan and Europe increased.  As foreign 
dollar claims increased, the capacity of the United 
States to cover those claims with a roughly ﬁ xed supply 
of gold reserves came into question, and in 1971-1973 
the ﬁ xed rate system broke down.  It was replaced with 
the current system of ﬂ oating rates among major cur-
rencies, with minor currencies sometimes ﬂ oating but 
often ﬁ xed or closely managed in relation to a major 
currency, most commonly the dollar. 
Th e trade and current accounts moved brieﬂ y into 
surplus in 1975 with the devaluation of the dollar and 
a severe recession in 1974-1975.  Th is was followed, 
however, by a very sharp deterioration of the trade 
and current accounts in the mid-1980s, as the U.S. 
macroeconomic policy mix of large ﬁ scal deﬁ cits and 
severe anti-inﬂ ationary monetary restraint produced a 
large drop in national saving and a sharp appreciation 
of the dollar.  However, a relative stabilization of the 
ﬁ scal position, the easing of monetary policy, and an 
internationally coordinated intervention combined to 
bring the dollar back down in 1985 and swing the trade 
and current accounts back towards balance.  (Indeed, 
the large transfers to the United States from allies to 
ﬁ nance the Gulf War brought the current account into 
surplus temporarily in 1991.)
Since 1991, as Figure 2 shows, the U.S. current account 
and trade balances have been in virtually unremitting 
decline, the former reaching about 6.1 percent of GDP 
in 2005 and 2006.  Current account deﬁ cits of this 
size are nearly twice the earlier record of 3.4 percent 
of GDP reached in 1987, and far above the levels once 
thought to be “sustainable” in the near term in the 
conventional economic wisdom.5  It is striking that the 
current account deﬁ cit has now grown to about half of 
goods and services exports.
Th e fall in the trade balance, as Figure 2 shows, has 
accounted for the entire decline in the current account 
balance.  Th is decline in the trade balance, apart from 
Figure 2.  U.S. Balances on Current Account, Trade, Income, and Unilateral Current Transfers, 
1960-2006*
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8the recent impact of higher oil prices, has been due 
primarily to a slowdown in export growth, especially af-
ter 1994, rather than (as commonly believed) a ﬂ ood of 
imports from China or elsewhere.  U.S. non-petroleum 
imports grew at about 8 percent per year both dur-
ing 1984-1994 and from 1994-2006. Non-petroleum 
exports, on the other hand, grew at 9.2 percent per 
year during 1984-1994, but at only 6.1 percent during 
1994-2006.  Th is slowdown in export growth was very 
broadly based and not conﬁ ned to particular products 
or importing countries.  Th e reason for the slowdown 
is something of a puzzle, but it appears to be related to 
a continuing appreciation of the dollar and perhaps an 
increased sensitivity of exports to relative prices as the 
pace of globalization accelerated in the last decade.6
Th e net sales of U.S. assets abroad to ﬁ nance these 
trade and current account deﬁ cits resulted in a decline 
in the (negative) U.S. net investment position, which 
in turn gave rise to a smaller surplus on investment in-
come.  Th e possible explanations of this unprecedented 
decline and its implications are discussed below, where 
we also examine the modest improvement in the trade 
balance in 2006-2007 and the apparent stabilization 
and possible improvement in the current account 
balance.
Current Accounts Abroad   
Th e U.S. current account deﬁ cit and associated net 
capital imports have their counterparts, of course, in 
net current account surpluses and capital exports in 
the rest of the world.  Figures 3 and 4 show the esti-
mated national composition of global current account 
deﬁ cits and surpluses in 2006, and the recent evolution 
of the current account surpluses of the major surplus 
countries or groups of countries juxtaposed against the 
growing U.S. deﬁ cit.
As shown in Figure 3, the United States in 2006 
accounted for an extraordinary 60.5 percent of the 
world’s net capital imports.  Seven relatively advanced 
economies each accounted for some 2-8 percent (and 
in the aggregate about one-fourth) of the total, and 
all other countries together for less than 15 percent.  
Capital exports are less concentrated by country, but 
a small group of surplus countries – China, Japan, 
Germany, and the oil and gas exporters – nevertheless 
account for about two-thirds of global capital exports.ii 
As Figure 4 indicates, Japan has run chronic current 
account surpluses for many years – the last recorded 
deﬁ cit was in 1980 – and eﬀ ectively has provided the 
counterpart to the U.S. deﬁ cits.  However, as the U.S. 
deﬁ cit has grown in recent years, large surpluses have 
also emerged in Germany (which also ran surpluses 
in the late 1980s), China, the newly industrialized 
Asian economies, and especially, with the recent rise in 
energy prices, the oil and gas exporters in the Middle 
East, Russia, and elsewhere.  As seen in Figure 1, these 
recently burgeoning surpluses, along with that of Japan, 
now total roughly 2.15 percent of world GDP, fully ac-
counting for the equivalent U.S. current account deﬁ cit 
of about 1.8 percent.
While a larger number of developing countries import 
rather than export capital, a striking recent develop-
ment in the global pattern of capital ﬂ ows is the shift of 
many newly industrialized and emerging market econo-
mies from their traditional role as importers of capital 
to that of capital exporters, usually with large current 
account surpluses.  China, whose current account sur-
plus has grown over the last decade from less than $10 
billion to about $238.5 billion, or 9 percent of GDP in 
2006, is the most striking example; but large current 
account surpluses have also characterized Hong Kong, 
Malaysia, Taiwan, and Singapore during recent years, 
and other countries have seen their current account 
deﬁ cits fall.  Conversely, not only the United States, but 
also the United Kingdom and some major European 
countries such as France, Italy, and Spain, now import 
more capital than they export.7
Th e U.S. Capital Accountiii
Th e large expansion of international trade in goods 
and services in the last several decades has been accom-
panied by an even more rapid and dramatic growth of 
ii While Germany and the Benelux countries have recently run large surpluses, the euro area as a whole ran a small current account deﬁ cit in 2006, with 
Spain and Portugal having large deﬁ cits.  Because of the single currency, a common monetary policy, and constraints on national ﬁ scal policies introduced 
by the Stability and Growth Pact, individual euro-area countries are circumscribed in the policies available to address external imbalances, as we discuss 
below. 
iii In accordance with common usage, we use the traditional “capital account” to refer to what BEA now terms the “ﬁ nancial account.”  Th e new “capital 
account” refers to the accounting of a set of relatively insigniﬁ cant capital transfer items.
9Figure 3.  Major Net Exporters and Importers of Capital in 2006*
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cross-border trade in assets.8  Global economic growth, 
the reduction of national barriers, large declines in the 
costs of transactions and communications, and innova-
tion have facilitated international specialization in the 
trade of physical and ﬁ nancial assets just as they have 
in trade of goods and services.  Th is capital mobility 
appears to have been enhanced by a reduction in the 
“home bias” which links national investment to saving, 
prompting the international diversiﬁ cation of invest-
ment portfolios.9  Increased capital mobility has not 
come without costs, such as the ﬁ nancial instability and 
economic hardship experienced in the Asian crisis of 
the late 1990s.  And foreign investments are sometimes 
undertaken to avoid tariﬀ s, taxes, or regulations, there-
by raising private, but not necessarily social, returns.  
Nevertheless, we believe that cross-border investments 
have generally beneﬁ ted society, as capital sought its 
highest returns, resources were transferred from lend-
ers to borrowers, assisted by ﬁ nancial intermediation, 
and portfolio diversiﬁ cation spread and reduced risk.
Figure 5 shows the increases (relative to GDP) in U.S. 
capital outﬂ ows (net asset purchases, which are virtu-
ally all private) and inﬂ ows (net asset sales) since 1982, 
with the latter divided between oﬃ  cial and private 
inﬂ ows.10  Th e increase was especially large after 1991, 
albeit interrupted by the 1998 Asian crisis, the end of 
the dot-com bubble, and the subsequent brief recession 
in 2001.  Both inﬂ ows and outﬂ ows of private capital 
have been large and rapidly growing, reﬂ ecting the glo-
balization of asset trade discussed above.  As Figure 5 
indicates, net private capital inﬂ ows, at least as oﬃ  cially 
recorded, ﬁ nanced most of the growing current account 
deﬁ cit until about 2002; but since 2003, recorded 
oﬃ  cial purchases of dollar assets have increased sub-
stantially.  In addition, a proportion of the massive 
asset accumulations of the monetary authorities and 
sovereign wealth funds of the oil exporters shows up 
as private capital inﬂ ows into the United States after 
intermediation directly by private agents or indirectly 
by the capital markets in third countries.
Th e U.S. Net International Investment Position 
(NIIP)  
As a result of this rapid growth in capital ﬂ ows, the 
stock of both assets and liabilities rose rapidly in rela-
tion to GDP, as shown in Figure 6, which reﬂ ects both 
these capital ﬂ ows and changes in asset valuations.  Th e 
Figure 4.  Current Account Balances of Selected Countries and Regions, 1992-2006
(Surplus (+) or Deficit (-), Percent of World GDP)
China*
Germany
Japan
United States**
Fuel Exporters*
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Source: International Monetary Fund
*2006 is an IMF projection
**Data do not reflect June 2006 current account revisions
11
Figure 5.  U.S. Gross Capital Outflows and Private and Official Inflows, 1982-2006
(Inflows (+) and Outflows (-), Current Account Deficit (+), Percent of GDP)
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Figure 6.  U.S. Assets, Liabilities, and Net International Investment Position, 1982-2006*
(Assets (+) and Liabilities (-), Percent of GDP)
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Figure 7.  Rates of Return on U.S. Assets Abroad and Foreign Assets in the United States,
1983-2006*
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*Direct investment at market value.  Rates of return are equal to the income receipts (payments) on U.S.-owned assets abroad (foreign-owned assets in the United States) divided by the 
average of beginning-of-year and end-of-year values for total assets
diﬀ erence between these gross asset and liability posi-
tions is the U.S. net international investment position 
(NIIP).  Because the U.S. current account deﬁ cit has 
as a counterpart a corresponding net sale of assets, the 
NIIP in principle must equal the cumulative total of its 
current account deﬁ cits adjusted for valuation changes.  
(In practice, the recorded assets and liabilities are 
subject to signiﬁ cant measurement errors.)  As Figure 6 
shows, the persistent U.S. current account deﬁ cits since 
the early 1980s have produced a substantial decline 
in the NIIP, which declined from a creditor position 
of $236 billion (+7.2 percent of GDP) in 1982 to a 
debtor position of $-2.140 trillion (-16.0 percent of 
GDP) in 2006.
Although U.S. net external debt has increased greatly 
since 1980, its rise has been greatly moderated because 
the total returns to the United States on its assets held 
abroad have been systematically larger than the total 
returns paid to foreigners on U.S. liabilities.11  Two 
factors account for this:
1. Th e income on U.S. assets held abroad consistently 
has exceeded that on its foreign liabilities.  Th is 
is partly because a larger proportion of assets 
than liabilities has been in portfolio and direct 
investment equities that produced higher earnings 
than ﬁ xed-income securities.  However, the income 
returns have also tended to be larger on U.S. assets 
than liabilities within asset classes, and consistently 
so for foreign direct investment (FDI).12  Figure 7 
shows the persistent diﬀ erential between income 
on all U.S. assets and liabilities, which averaged 
1.2 percentage points during 1983-2006; Figure 8 
shows this diﬀ erential for FDI only.
2. Valuation changes have substantially raised the 
value of U.S. assets relative to liabilities.  Th ese 
“capital gains” (broadly deﬁ ned) resulted from price 
changes (which again principally beneﬁ ted equity 
investments), exchange rate changes (whereby the 
depreciation of the dollar increases the dollar value 
of U.S.-owned assets abroad), and a broad set of 
“other changes” in valuation.13
As a result of this diﬀ erence in total returns, the large 
shift of the United States from net creditor to net 
debtor status was much smaller than might have been 
expected from the cumulative eﬀ ect of the deﬁ cits on 
trade and transfers.  Th us, while the deﬁ cit on trade 
and transfers during 1983-2006 totaled $6.6 trillion, 
the decline in the NIIP was only $2.4 trillion.  Of the 
13
$4.2 trillion diﬀ erence, the favorable income diﬀ erential 
accounted for $0.6 trillion, while valuation changes 
accounted for a full $3.6 trillion.  Th ese diﬀ erential 
returns that attenuate the decline of the U.S. NIIP 
help to increase the sustainability of large U.S. current 
account deﬁ cits, which we examine below.
U.S. Liabilities, International Portfolios, and 
International Reserves  
As U.S. international indebtedness has increased, of 
course, the asset holdings and net investment posi-
tions of countries with current account surpluses have 
tended to increase.  As we shall see below, two issues 
that are of considerable importance in examining the 
sustainability of international imbalances are the role of 
the dollar in international portfolios and the position of 
oﬃ  cial international dollar reserves in the international 
liabilities of the United States.  Th e integration of capi-
tal markets has led to considerable portfolio diversiﬁ ca-
tion internationally.  Th e United States, by virtue of 
both its size and the relative depth of its capital mar-
kets, is by far the largest producer of ﬁ nancial assets.  A 
recent estimate suggests that U.S. liabilities comprise 
Figure 8.  Rates of Return on U.S. Direct Investment Abroad and Foreign Direct Investment in the 
United States, 1983-2006*
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roughly 40 percent of global gross holdings of foreign 
assets.14  As Figure 9 shows, from the perspective of 
U.S. international liabilities, this is reﬂ ected in the large 
absolute and relative increase in portfolio assets (U.S. 
Treasury securities and other bonds and corporate 
stocks), which increased from 16 percent to 36 percent 
of total liabilities during 1982-2006.
During the last decade, foreign oﬃ  cial holdings of dol-
lar reserves have consistently been less than 20 percent 
of total U.S. international liabilities – a smaller propor-
tion than the 20-30 percent characteristic of the 1980s 
and early 1990s.  However, the proportion has risen 
since 2000; and just as private dollar asset holdings 
have exploded in the past decade, U.S. oﬃ  cial dollar lia-
bilities have become very large.  (See Figure 9.)  Foreign 
exchange reserves are also held in a few other major 
currencies, and Figure 10 shows the dramatic growth 
in the recorded foreign exchange reserve holdings of se-
lected large reserve holders over the last decade.  Figure 
10 also shows year-end 2006 reserves, which are very 
large by historical standards as percentages of annual 
imports of goods and services for these countries.
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Figure 9.  Composition of U.S. Gross Liabilities, 1982-2006
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Figure 10.  Selected Countries with Large Reserve Holdings, 1999-2006*
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Th e large international imbalances in trade and cur-
rent accounts, and the associated capital movements, 
are the result of the interplay of myriad economic 
variables – such as incomes, prices, interest rates, and 
exchange rates – that aﬀ ect economic behavior in the 
global economy.  Th ese variables are mutually and 
simultaneously determined, while changing through 
time.  As a result, it is diﬃ  cult to identify simple causal 
relationships that deﬁ nitively locate the “sources” of the 
imbalances, and a number of diﬀ erent explanations 
have been oﬀ ered to account for them.  While these 
explanations are often presented as competitive, in fact 
they are not mutually exclusive and often complement 
one another.  For instance, other things being equal, 
both a reduction in U.S. net saving and an increase in 
the desire of foreigners to hold dollar assets will tend to 
raise the value of the dollar, although through diﬀ erent 
mechanisms.  
Th ese explanations highlight diﬀ erent changes in the 
global economy that appear to us as quite plausible 
causal factors in the growth of the imbalances.15  Five 
such factors seem to be particularly important:
1. A global “mismatch” between the United States 
and certain major surplus countries in their desired 
saving and investment; 
2. A strong demand for dollar assets in foreign private 
and oﬃ  cial portfolios; 
3. Until very recently, rapid economic growth (fueled 
by domestic demand) in the United States relative 
to growth in other advanced economies;
4. Th e recent increase in energy prices; and
5. Exchange rate intervention by a number of coun-
tries to prevent appreciation against the dollar and 
promote export growth.
III.  The Sources of Large International Imbalances
The International “Mismatch” Between 
Desired Saving and Investment
Any country’s current account balance must equal the 
diﬀ erence between its national saving and investment, 
measured after the fact, as an arithmetic matter of 
national income accounting.  In this tautological sense, 
all current account imbalances can be “accounted for” by 
corresponding saving-investment imbalances; any fac-
tor that changes the current account must also induce 
a corresponding change in saving and/or investment.  
Th e international economy is a “general equilibrium” 
system in which “everything aﬀ ects everything else.”  
Nevertheless, there are fundamental factors such as the 
desire to save by households and national ﬁ scal policies 
that directly aﬀ ect trends in national saving and invest-
ment and contribute powerfully to these “mismatches.”
Th e Decline in U.S. Saving
As shown in Figure 11, U.S. net domestic saving has 
declined from over 10 percent of GDP in the 1960s to 
0 to 2 percent in the last several years.iv  Th is drop in 
domestic saving was driven principally by a steady de-
cline in personal saving (mitigated by strong corporate 
saving) and a rise in dissaving by the federal govern-
ment, as the federal budget moved into chronic deﬁ cit, 
apart from a brief period of surpluses in 1998-2001.  
Personal consumption expenditures (as conventionally 
deﬁ ned) have risen steadily from 63 percent of GDP 
in 1960 to 70 percent in 2006, with a corresponding 
decline in net personal saving from an average of 6 
percent in the 1960s to its current negative value.  Th is 
long-term downward trend of personal saving was 
compounded by the rapid increase in personal wealth 
associated ﬁ rst with the stock market boom of the late 
1990s, and subsequently with the run-up in housing 
values.  Th e recent end of the housing boom presum-
ably will mitigate some of this most recent household 
saving decline, as households increase savings to oﬀ set 
iv Net, rather than gross, saving and investment is the appropriate concept in this context, because the foreign saving obtained from abroad supplements 
net domestic saving in ﬁ nancing net investment.  Th e total domestic saving-investment balance is the same whether gross or net of depreciation.
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declining home values – unless a rising stock market 
oﬀ sets the loss of housing wealth.
Because net domestic investment has ﬂ uctuated within 
a range of about 6-12 percent of GDP, with a much 
milder downward trend, there has emerged a persistent 
long-term gap between U.S. domestic investment and 
saving – equivalent to the gap between domestic expen-
ditures and production.v  Th is gap has been ﬁ lled by 
importing resources from abroad, and selling assets to 
pay for them.  To be sure, this evolution of the invest-
ment-saving gap has had several stages.  Generally dur-
ing the 1970s and 1980s, and more recently after 2001, 
the rise in the current account deﬁ cit was sometimes 
simplistically attributed to the large federal budget 
deﬁ cits that depressed national saving (the “twin deﬁ -
cits” view).  However, during the 1990s boom, when 
investment was very strong, the current account deﬁ cit 
continued to grow in spite of federal budget surpluses 
and higher national saving.  Th e diﬀ erence between total 
investment and saving is the critical variable, but the 
longer-term trends in the United States certainly call 
attention to the importance of the fall in saving.16  In 
some other advanced economies, such as Japan, saving 
rates have also fallen, but investment rates generally fell 
as much or more.
Th is shortfall in U.S. saving is thus an important part 
of the story of the emergence of large current account 
imbalances.  However, this cannot be the whole story, 
because a growing gap between U.S. desired investment 
and saving, other things equal, would raise long-term 
interest rates.  A remarkable feature of the last few 
years is that long-term interest rates have remained low. 
Th is strongly suggests a rising supply of desired saving 
(relative to investment) abroad.
Th e Emergence of Saving-Investment Gaps Abroad
A number of factors have contributed to the emergence 
of a large gap between saving and investment for some 
of the major exporters of capital.  Th is gap has been 
famously called a “savings glut,” which perhaps describes 
China, whose very high gross investment rate of 44 
percent is nevertheless overshadowed by an extraor-
dinary 51 percent gross saving rate.17  However, in a 
number of advanced and emerging market economies, 
v Th e current account balance, which reﬂ ects this resource gap, also reﬂ ects a sometimes sizable and highly variable statistical discrepancy related to the 
mismeasurement of saving and/or investment.
Figure 11.  U.S. Net Domestic Investment, and Net National, Corporate, Personal, and 
Government Saving, 1960-2006*
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the gap might better be characterized as a slump in 
investment.  Global investment, especially if the United 
States is excluded, has shown a downward trend over 
thirty years.18  But in any case, as noted above, it is 
the diﬀ erence between saving and investment that is 
relevant for the emergence of large imbalances.
Among the large industrial countries, Japan and 
Germany stand out with respect to a gross saving-
investment gap.  (See Figure 12.)  Both these large 
economies have experienced weak economic growth 
in the recent past; the prolonged stagnation of the 
Japanese economy during the 1990s was especially 
severe.  Notwithstanding recent modest increases in 
growth, investment rates have declined signiﬁ cantly 
in both countries in response to both long periods of 
weak growth and population aging, which has reduced 
the relative number of younger people and thereby 
the demand for investment to equip new workers and 
provide for additional housing and schools.  More gen-
erally, older, aging societies such as Japan and Germany 
may ﬁ nd more attractive investment opportunities 
for their savings abroad than at home, especially if 
their economies are less ﬂ exible and dynamic than the 
foreign alternatives.19  A number of smaller European 
countries that share some of these same characteris-
tics, such as Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Finland, and Sweden, are also running very large cur-
rent account surpluses relative to GDP (while the euro 
area as a whole is in approximate saving-investment 
and current account balance).
Many newly industrialized and emerging market econo-
mies, with the notable exception of China (discussed 
below), have also experienced a decline in national in-
vestment rates during the last decade.  Th e investment 
decline may in part reﬂ ect caution and increased risk 
aversion in reaction to the ﬁ nancial and economic crises 
of the late 1990s, and a recognition that some invest-
ments made during the preceding boom and surge of 
capital imports were ill conceived.  At the same time, 
rapid output growth and higher public saving have 
tended to support overall saving rates, which generally 
fell less than investment, or recovered more.20
Precautionary motives related to public saving and 
protection against sudden capital outﬂ ows such as 
those of the late 1990s also have contributed to the 
Figure 12.  Gross Saving and Investment in Japan, Germany, and the United States, 1980-2006
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recent exceptionally large accumulation of oﬃ  cial 
foreign exchange reserves.  Th e newly industrialized 
Asian countries have consistently run high saving rates 
and current account surpluses associated with export-
led growth, often facilitated by managed exchange 
rates.  Taken as a group, the emerging Asian economies 
other than China and India averaged current account 
deﬁ cits of 11 percent of exports during the 1988-1997 
decade, but in the last decade have moved into current 
account surplus, accompanied by large accumulations 
of reserves.21
The Strong Demand for Dollar Assets
Analysts focusing on diﬀ erences between savings and 
investment have tended to emphasize the “resource gap” 
between total expenditures and output, which shows 
up as the trade deﬁ cit.  However, independent trends in 
capital ﬂ ows, and in particular a rising net demand for 
dollar assets, have contributed to the rising imbalances.  
Here the mechanism is more indirect; capital inﬂ ows 
most immediately raise the value of the dollar and dol-
lar assets, setting in motion changes in wealth, incomes, 
interest rates, relative prices, and expenditures that in-
crease the U.S. trade and current account deﬁ cits.  Th is 
explanation complements and overlaps the view that 
focuses on excess savings abroad, since such savings 
need to be invested somewhere.  But why especially or 
disproportionately in the United States?
Th ere are several apparent sources of the strong de-
mand for dollar assets:
Globalization and Portfolio Diversiﬁ cation
As noted above, as the integration of national capital 
markets has accelerated over the last several decades, 
asset trade has grown substantially faster than trade in 
goods and services, which in turn has outpaced growth 
in global output.22  An integral part of this growth in 
asset trade has been a reduction in the “home bias” that 
has historically channeled a country’s saving into invest-
ments in the same country and currency.23  Th is reduc-
tion in home bias implies that private foreign investors 
will diversify their portfolios, shifting their demand at 
the margin from “home assets” to those denominated 
in dollars and other currencies.  Such diversiﬁ cation 
presumably would reduce a portfolio’s perceived risk by 
more than the shift from familiar home assets would 
increase it.  Indeed, it may be useful to view some of 
this diversiﬁ cation as a process of ﬁ nancial intermedia-
tion, whereby foreign investors acquire lower-risk U.S. 
assets, and U.S. investors make more-risky (and higher-
yielding) investments abroad.24
At the same time that foreign investors diversify into 
dollar assets, of course, U.S. investors diversify out of 
dollar assets.  However, because private saving relative 
to total income is substantially higher abroad than in 
the United States, the portfolio allocation of a signiﬁ -
cant proportion of new global saving in proportion to 
national economic size increases the net demand for 
dollar assets.  And, because the proportion of new for-
eign saving so allocated to U.S. assets is larger than the 
proportion of U.S. saving ﬂ owing abroad, net demand 
is further increased.25  In the future, a reduction in 
legal, institutional, and “cultural” constraints on capital 
outﬂ ows and diversiﬁ cation may reduce home bias 
abroad, but the development of foreign capital markets 
may also reduce home bias in the United States, so 
the future net impact on dollar asset demand appears 
uncertain.
Th e Dollar as International Money and the Principal 
Reserve Currency
Domestic money serves as a unit of account, a medium 
of exchange, a source of liquidity, and a (sometimes) 
safe store of value.  Th e same is true of international 
money, for which the U.S. dollar is the premier curren-
cy serving these functions in both private and oﬃ  cial 
portfolios.
As international transactions in goods, services, and as-
sets have rapidly expanded, the need for private dollar 
balances to ﬁ nance those transactions has increased, 
because a large proportion of international transac-
tions is invoiced in dollars.  Because the U.S. economy 
is so large and institutionally developed, its broad and 
deep ﬁ nancial markets oﬀ er low transaction costs that 
enhance liquidity.  Similarly, as foreign savings have 
grown, the need for safe assets in which to store their 
value, away from prospective political or economic 
turbulence, has grown for both private savers and 
the central banks and governments that hold oﬃ  cial 
reserves.  Low inﬂ ation and strong property rights have 
helped make the dollar a relatively safe store of value, 
and U.S. Treasury securities are especially important 
in providing liquidity and safety to private investors as 
well as to central banks and government entities hold-
ing oﬃ  cial reserves.
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Oﬃ  cial dollar reserves also function as a means of 
temporarily ﬁ nancing adverse shifts in the trade balance 
or capital outﬂ ows and thereby moderating the negative 
impact of such changes on a domestic economy.  As 
noted above, the oﬃ  cial reserves of many developing 
economies have grown extremely rapidly in the past 
few years.  Th eir accumulation arguably has been a 
precautionary measure to reduce the risk of a repetition 
of the severe economic shocks some developing nations 
experienced in the late 1990s in response to capital 
ﬂ ight and exchange rate volatility.26  Some argue that 
this reserve accumulation has been larger than precau-
tion and prudence might require, although this claim 
is controversial.27  In any case, the growth of oﬃ  cial 
dollar reserves and other dollar liabilities has exploded 
recently also as a result of the increase in energy prices 
and very active exchange rate intervention by China 
and other export-driven economies, as discussed below.
Th e U.S. Economy as a Magnet for Foreign Capital
Quite apart from the roles of the dollar as international 
money and a vehicle for portfolio diversiﬁ cation, the 
large and dynamic U.S. economy, and the assets that 
are claims upon it, undoubtedly oﬀ er major attractions 
to foreign investors.28  Th e World Economic Forum 
has consistently given the United States high rankings 
with regard to its “business climate.”29  As Japanese auto 
makers discovered many years ago, the openness of the 
U.S. economy, the large size of its product markets, its 
innovative culture, the ﬂ exibility of its labor markets, 
and the strength of its legal and ﬁ nancial institutions 
create a premier location for foreign direct investment 
(FDI).  FDI in the United States has been rising, both 
absolutely and relative to GDP, for three decades – 
with an especially large surge during the strong eco-
nomic growth of the 1990s.
In recent years, U.S. technological innovation and 
productivity growth generally have been stronger than 
those in other advanced economies and have attracted 
foreign capital as well as FDI to U.S. portfolio equities.  
A dramatic increase in such investment occurred in the 
late 1990s, with a massive inﬂ ow of capital seeking high 
returns from the technology boom; this contributed to 
both the stock market boom and a sharp appreciation 
of the dollar.  Although these inﬂ ows, of course, fell oﬀ  
sharply in 2001-2003 after the boom collapsed, FDI 
inﬂ ows have partially recovered and inﬂ ows of portfolio 
equity remain far above their pre-1997 levels.  (See 
Figures 13 and 14.)
Th ere is therefore little doubt that the attractions of the 
dollar and the U.S. economy for foreign investors have 
played an important role in the growth of the U.S. cur-
rent account deﬁ cit.  Nevertheless, as with the interna-
tional mismatches in desired saving and investment, it 
seems unlikely that this is the whole story.
First, a signiﬁ cant proportion of recorded private 
capital inﬂ ows may reﬂ ect to some degree the ac-
tions of foreign oﬃ  cial institutions rather than purely 
autonomous private investment decisions.  Th is hap-
pens directly when purchases of dollar assets in U.S. 
custodial accounts are made by foreign banks or other 
private agents acting under the instruction of central 
banks or national investment authorities.  An indirect, 
but important, mechanism is the “recycling” of oﬃ  cial 
foreign saving indirectly into dollar assets through 
the international capital markets.  For instance, the 
acquisition by foreign authorities of bank deposits or 
other assets (whether in dollars or other currencies) in 
a third country may give rise to portfolio adjustments 
that create an outﬂ ow of private capital from that coun-
try into the United States.  A recent study, noting that 
the increase in net ﬁ nancial inﬂ ows into the United 
States since 2002 has closely mirrored the net outﬂ ows 
from oil exporters, concludes that “most petrodollar 
investments are ﬁ nding their way to the United States, 
indirectly if not directly.”30  Th is is, to be sure, private 
foreign capital ﬂ owing into the United States, but 
foreign oﬃ  cial asset accumulation is closely related to 
such capital movements.
Second, while very large net inﬂ ows of portfolio capital 
into bonds, and especially U.S. Treasury securities, 
surely reﬂ ect the comparative advantage of the United 
States and the dollar in providing a safe and liquid 
repository for saving, the case regarding equity capital 
is less compelling.  Flows of private equity capital into 
the United States have been matched by equity capital 
exports, sometimes as components of the same transac-
tion, notably in international mergers and acquisitions.  
Over the last two decades of very rapidly increasing, 
but volatile, equity investments, U.S. exports of port-
folio equity have generally exceeded imports (except 
during the dot-com boom), while FDI has gone 
abroad and entered the United States in roughly equal 
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Figure 14.  Foreign Direct Investment: U.S. Outflows, Inflows, and Difference,
1960-2006*
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Figure 13.  Corporate Stock Purchases: U.S. Outflows, Inflows, and Difference,
1982-2006
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amounts.  Whatever magnet draws equity capital across 
the U.S. border appears to pull strongly in both direc-
tions.  Th e reported earnings on this U.S. equity abroad 
(both portfolio and especially FDI) have consistently 
exceeded the corresponding earnings on foreign equity 
in the United States during the last decade of rapidly 
rising current account deﬁ cits, although this earnings 
diﬀ erential may to some degree reﬂ ect tax consider-
ations and accounting practices that transfer reported 
proﬁ ts to foreign subsidiaries abroad.vi
Th e rise in the U.S. current account deﬁ cit might 
reasonably have been associated with capital imports 
that ﬁ nanced the rise in the U.S. investment rate during 
the technology boom of the 1990s, but it has continued 
in spite of relatively weak investment during the last 
six years.31  While private capital inﬂ ows continue, for 
the last ﬁ ve years the United States has been able to sell 
these private assets to most of the developed world only 
at progressively lower prices (exchange rates).  And as 
the IMF has recently noted, the composition of U.S. 
capital inﬂ ows has been shifting from equity to debt, 
and within debt away from U.S. Treasury securities to 
riskier forms of debt.32  
All of these considerations are hard to reconcile with 
the view that an extremely large global advantage to 
investing in the United States relative to other coun-
tries is the predominant factor driving the U.S. current 
account deﬁ cit.
Relatively Rapid U.S. Economic Growth
After 1991, when the sharp decline in the current 
account began, the United States grew faster than 
the average of other advanced economies until 2006.  
Rapid U.S. growth tended to expand the trade deﬁ cit 
directly, by increasing the demand for imports, and 
probably also contributed to the inﬂ ow of capital 
described above.  Th ere is some empirical support for 
an association between economic growth and trade and 
current account deﬁ cits, and this may be intensiﬁ ed 
for the United States because U.S. imports appear to 
respond to domestic growth more strongly than U.S. 
exports respond to growth abroad.33   Again, however, 
this explanation seems more persuasive for the boom-
ing 1990s than for the current decade.  In any case, 
vi Earnings, of course, are not total returns, and attempts to account for capital gains and other “valuation” eﬀ ects makes the matter more complicated.
this is certainly not a simple relationship, because 
economic growth is also associated with – and may 
in fact be driven by – an expansion of export capacity 
that improves the trade balance, and is also associated 
with higher saving.34  Th us, many rapidly growing 
Asian economies, following export-led policies, have 
run chronic trade and current account surpluses.  
Furthermore, recent research suggests that, as a long-
term matter over the past 25 years, the U.S. trade 
deﬁ cit’s growth can be attributed almost entirely to a 
continuing appreciation of the dollar, and relative eco-
nomic growth rates have not played a signiﬁ cant role.35  
Th e conﬂ icting empirical evidence presents a puzzle, 
although some of the apparent conﬂ ict may result from 
diﬀ ering short-term and long-term eﬀ ects.  It is prob-
ably fair to say that both the exchange rate and (at least 
in the short to medium term) relative growth rates have 
played a signiﬁ cant role.
The Recent Rise in Energy Prices
A very large source of the recent sharp rise in inter-
national imbalances has been the rise in energy prices 
and the enormous trade and current account surpluses 
of major energy exporters, and, of course, the dete-
rioration of the balances of energy importers.  (Th e 
Chinese 2006 current account surplus of 9 percent 
of GDP might have been signiﬁ cantly larger without 
the oil price increase, which was caused in part by 
surging Chinese energy demand.36)  Oil prices more 
than doubled from 2002-2006, and the oil revenues of 
fuel exporters more than tripled.37  In response, their 
imports rose by only about one-third to one-half of the 
increase in oil exports, so that their current account 
surpluses rose from $62 billion in 2002 to $396 billion, 
or almost one percent of world GDP, in 2006.  Th ese 
2006 surpluses were about 1.7 times that of China, and 
1.25 times those of Japan and Germany combined.38
Arithmetically, the rise in oil prices accounts directly 
for roughly 40 percent of the rise in the U.S. current 
account deﬁ cit from 2001 to 2006.39  However, both 
goods and capital markets have also responded to 
higher energy prices and increased saving by the oil 
exporters, with indirect eﬀ ects on the U.S. current 
account.  On the one hand, the increased saving by the 
oil exporters depresses global demand and economic 
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activity.  Th is has slowed the U.S. economy, moderating 
import demand and (oil prices aside) the deterioration 
of the trade balance.  However, the higher saving also 
has given rise to capital exports by the oil exporters 
that have increased liquidity and reduced interest rates 
worldwide.  Th is external ﬁ nancing supported invest-
ment and raised asset prices, notably for housing.  In 
the United States, the wealth eﬀ ect of the housing 
boom appears to have increased consumption and, 
presumably, imports and the trade deﬁ cit.
In the 1970s, the supply-side oil shocks, combined with 
a drop in productivity growth in the industrial coun-
tries, helped to produce not only large international 
imbalances, but also stagﬂ ation; prices rose sharply, 
creating a major drop in global demand.  Th e recent oil 
price increase, however, has been primarily demand-
driven, and global demand has continued to grow 
rapidly.  In addition, although the oil exporters have 
not increased imports more rapidly than in the 1970s, 
the globalization of capital markets has facilitated an 
eﬃ  cient recycling of their saving to the oil importers, 
where higher asset prices and lower interest rates have 
supported demand.  Th e global eﬀ ect has therefore 
been a large increase in international imbalances, but 
without the global recession that characterized the 
1970s.  Th e prospects are for a continued need for 
such recycling; oil prices have remained high, and 
most analysts expect a signiﬁ cant portion of the recent 
increases to be relatively permanent.40  As discussed 
below, some oil producers are undertaking large invest-
ment programs, which should assist a gradual adjust-
ment to higher energy prices that will help reduce the 
imbalances.
Export-Promotion Policies and Exchange 
Rate Intervention
During nearly 30 years of economic liberalization and 
integration into the global economy, China has strongly 
and consistently promoted exports.  Th e appeal of 
export-oriented FDI may stem from the transfer of 
technological and organizational learning (external to 
the ﬁ rm).  Some argue that, in China’s case, export pro-
motion is necessary for the very rapid growth required 
to absorb more than 200 million additional underem-
ployed rural workers into the non-agricultural labor 
force, and that the government’s unattractive alternative 
is higher unemployment and a greater risk of social and 
political unrest.41  Whatever the case, China’s poli-
cies have produced impressive results for many years.  
China has averaged 9.7 percent annual growth over 
the last two decades, and raised real per capita income 
at an astounding 8.6 percent annual rate, according 
to IMF data.42  Th e domestic investment rate (unlike 
that in other Asian countries) has risen rapidly, to 
about 44 percent of GDP in 2006, but the saving rate 
has risen even faster, to about 51 percent.  As a result, 
the current account surplus increased by 2006 to 9.1 
percent of GDP, and reserves to over $1 trillion, about 
40 percent of GDP and 114  percent of exports.43  
In the U.S. political arena, the rising U.S. trade and 
current account deﬁ cits have been viewed principally 
as the result of foreign exchange rate intervention to 
prevent or limit the appreciation of other currencies 
(depreciation of the dollar), especially by China, and by 
smaller Asian economies such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
Malaysia, and Singapore that also link their currencies 
closely to the dollar.  ( Japan also actively intervened to 
depreciate the yen prior to March 2004.)  However, a 
ﬁ xed renminbi-dollar rate considerably antedates the 
dramatic surge in the Chinese trade surplus, which 
began only in 2004; and China also grew rapidly, 
with a ﬂ ourishing export sector, before the surge.  Th e 
ﬁ xed-rate policy may originally have been adopted to 
anchor and stabilize the renminbi; China’s restraint in 
not devaluing during the 1998 Asian crisis was widely 
welcomed as a contribution to international stability.  
However, more recently, with rapid productivity growth 
and low inﬂ ation in China, and the depreciation of the 
dollar against the euro since 2002, the renminbi has 
come to be undervalued in eﬀ ective terms, as evidenced 
in part by the rapid rise in the trade and current ac-
count surpluses and oﬃ  cial reserves.  Th e weak ren-
minbi has stimulated exports, suppressed imports, and 
attracted FDI as part of the export-oriented growth 
strategy.
Some who focus on exchange rate intervention and 
export-driven growth, especially in China, as a source 
of the U.S. current account deﬁ cit tend to view the 
situation as one of “codependency” between China 
and the United States.  In this view, China secures the 
large consumer market and export-related FDI neces-
sary for growth, while the United States is enabled 
to spend more than it produces by borrowing the 
resources to allow spending to exceed output.  While 
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this oversimpliﬁ ed model does not do justice to the 
complexity of U.S.-Chinese economic relationships and 
exaggerates the likely stability of the current structure 
of Chinese trade and investment, it does remind us that 
producers, consumers, and policymakers all adapt to 
economic incentives and new structures as they de-
velop, which may then become diﬃ  cult to change.44
However, it is important to remember that the renmin-
bi exchange rate is only one of a number of factors that 
have contributed to the large Chinese trade surplus and 
rapid reserve accumulation.  China’s extraordinarily 
high saving rate, noted above, is related both to a weak 
social safety net, which fosters high precautionary 
saving, and an underdeveloped ﬁ nancial system, which 
lacks the capacity for intermediation needed to ﬁ nance 
higher consumption.  Government policies with respect 
to taxes and subsidies, the allocation of investment, and 
access to foreign exchange under capital controls all 
have strongly encouraged exports.
One particularly important element in Chinese ex-
port growth has been the interaction between global 
production networks and FDI-favoring policies that 
until recently had stringent requirements for export 
production.  A remarkable feature of globalization in 
recent years has been the increasingly ﬁ ne division of 
labor and activities within (and between) multina-
tional ﬁ rms, and those ﬁ rms’ geographical relocation of 
activities to achieve production eﬃ  ciencies, rather than 
to enhance market entry – resulting in a rapid growth 
of intra-ﬁ rm trade.45  In many developing economies, 
this meant undertaking processing and assembly of 
imported raw materials and components, in China’s 
case extensively for export.  Although there have been 
strong economic forces underlying the growth of these 
production networks, China’s vigorous promotion of 
FDI through tax, regulatory, and other instruments – 
in part by competitive and self-interested local govern-
ments and state-owned enterprises – has led to an 
enormous expansion of this processing activity.  Th e 
processing trade, which now accounts for about 55 
percent of China’s total exports and about 65 percent 
of its exports to the United States, is conducted largely 
by foreign enterprises.46
Th is processing-trade structure has several important 
implications.  One is that the import content of ex-
ports is very high, and Chinese value-added low, so 
that conventional measures overstate the contribution 
of China (and other processing-oriented developing 
economies) to global exports.  Th e outsourcing of 
certain production activities from some FDI exporters, 
such as the United States, may have the eﬀ ect of reduc-
ing conventionally measured current account balances 
in those countries and raising them in FDI importers.  
One study has estimated that about one-third of the 
2002 U.S. trade deﬁ cit could be accounted for by the 
“foreign aﬃ  liate trade deﬁ cit” – the diﬀ erence between 
imports from U.S. aﬃ  liates abroad and exports of 
foreign aﬃ  liates in the United States.  A conceptually 
somewhat diﬀ erent “ownership-based” trade deﬁ cit for 
2005 is about 17½ percent smaller than the conven-
tional measure.47  A second important implication of 
the processing trade is that the large import content 
of exports makes the Chinese trade surplus less re-
sponsive to changes in the exchange rate.  Th is fact, 
combined with the alternative sources of similar goods 
in other developing countries and the low price respon-
siveness of U.S. imports of labor-intensive goods, for 
which domestic substitutes are limited, suggests that 
appreciation of the renminbi is far from a panacea for 
the large U.S. current account deﬁ cit.
Finally, the rapid increases in the trade surplus and 
FDI at the same time have led to the extraordinary rise 
in China’s foreign exchange reserves, which reﬂ ect not 
only the large current account surplus, but a consistent 
capital account surplus over the past two decades.48  
In eﬀ ect, the reserve accumulation has provided the 
intermediation of domestic saving for both domestic 
investment and future consumption that is otherwise 
diﬃ  cult to achieve with a relatively underdeveloped 
ﬁ nancial system such as China’s.
Other Asian economies, often competitors with China 
in their export markets, have also tended to manage 
their exchange rates to promote export growth, al-
though (except for Hong Kong) with more ﬂ exibility 
than China.  Th e “newly industrialized economies” 
(Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore) ran cur-
rent account surpluses for many years, but after 1997 
these surpluses rose sharply (although Korea’s shrank 
dramatically during 2005-2006 after the won was al-
lowed to appreciate).  Since the crises of the late 1990s, 
which to a greater or lesser degree involved all these 
countries, their average investment rate has fallen from 
30-35 percent of GDP to about 25 percent, whereas 
their savings rates have fallen much less.  Other 
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emerging Asian economies, such as the “ASEAN-4” 
(Malaysia, Indonesia, Th ailand, and the Philippines), 
several of which experienced severe balance of pay-
ments crises and economic disruption in the late 1990s, 
have also seen sharply lower investment rates; prior to 
1998 they consistently imported capital (in the aggre-
gate), but since then have run signiﬁ cant, albeit declin-
ing, current account surpluses.49  For the emerging 
Asian economies apart from China and India, reserves 
have more than doubled in the post-1997 period.
Th ere are, therefore, a number of factors that have con-
verged to produce the current large international imbal-
ances.  But are these imbalances benign or dangerous?  
It is our view that these imbalances are not sustainable 
and create signiﬁ cant risks.  Because they are not sus-
tainable, adjustments to reduce them are inevitable and, 
in fact, have already begun.  Th e challenge to govern-
ments is to implement policies that will facilitate those 
adjustments and thereby reduce the risks that would 
be posed by the continuation and growth of such large 
imbalances.
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International imbalances in general, and the large U.S. 
current account deﬁ cit in particular, are often argued to 
be problematic because, if they prove to be unsustain-
able, the adjustment process that reduces them may 
prove disruptive to ﬁ nancial markets and to both the 
nations involved and the global economy at large.50  
However, judging when the U.S. current account deﬁ cit 
will become unsustainable has not been a very success-
ful enterprise in recent years, as analyses that suggested 
immediate dangers from large U.S. current account 
deﬁ cits have proved to be too pessimistic.
Th e deﬁ cit has risen for more than 15 years, since 
about 1991, although it appears to have stabilized in 
late 2006 and early 2007, when the trade deﬁ cit de-
clined as a result of falling oil prices and an apparent 
modest improvement in the non-petroleum trade deﬁ -
cit.  It is at present uncertain whether this constitutes 
a turning point for the deﬁ cit, or merely a pause in its 
climb.  During the 1990s, the rising deﬁ cit produced 
little concern, because it seemed clearly a response to 
strong private capital inﬂ ows associated with rising 
business investment, rising public and national saving, 
and an enhanced capacity to service a larger foreign 
debt.  However, the deﬁ cit continued to rise during the 
period of recession and recovery, with weaker non-
residential investment and declining national saving 
in 2001-2006.  Th is triggered a new set of warnings 
that the trend is unsustainable, and/or that dangerous 
thresholds for the size of the deﬁ cit or net foreign debt 
are being passed.51  Yet the rise of the deﬁ cit to 6.1 
percent of GDP in 2005 and 2006 had no clear nega-
tive eﬀ ects on the ﬁ nancial markets or the real economy. 
Indeed, in view of the decline in global investment, 
large U.S. deﬁ cits driven by powerful private consump-
tion growth have been a major force supporting the 
global economy over the past decade.
Should we therefore conclude that large current ac-
count deﬁ cits pose no risk and should be treated with 
“benign neglect” by policymakers?  We believe not, for 
the following reasons:
IV.  Risks Created by Continued Large Imbalances
Even Sustainable Imbalances May Produce 
Serious Problems
Although we do not believe that imbalances of the cur-
rent size are sustainable, some of the risks associated 
with them would exist even if (or, perhaps, especially 
if ) they proved to be sustainable for a long period of 
time.  We discuss two of these risks ﬁ rst, and then turn 
to the questions of sustainability and adjustment and 
the risks associated with them.
Protectionism
Economists are fond of pointing out that the principles 
of international specialization, that make possible 
the economic beneﬁ ts of trade in goods, services, and 
assets, imply that overall balances with the rest of the 
world, and not bilateral balances with particular coun-
tries, should command attention, because large bilateral 
imbalances are often necessary and appropriate.  Th is, 
unfortunately, is certainly not the public’s view, nor the 
picture presented in the headlines or often debated 
in the Congress.  When U.S. imports and trade and 
current account deﬁ cits grow rapidly, especially when 
associated with job displacement and outsourcing, the 
cry goes up to ﬁ nd “who’s responsible.”  
During the 1980s and 1990s, attention focused on 
the large U.S.-Japan trade deﬁ cit, which peaked at 1.2 
percent of U.S. GDP in 1986.  Th is led to domestic 
pressures and legislation for trade protection and 
continuing international tension and pressures on the 
Japanese for exchange rate appreciation and other mea-
sures to reduce exports to the United States.  Similarly, 
with the even larger growth in the overall trade deﬁ cit 
and imports in the last decade, the spotlight has turned 
on the U.S.-China bilateral trade deﬁ cit, which has 
grown extraordinarily rapidly from 0.8 percent of U.S. 
GDP in 2000 to 1.7 percent in 2006.  Th e result again 
has been pressure for protectionist legislation and 
high-level diplomatic eﬀ orts by the administration to 
persuade the Chinese to revalue the renminbi.52  
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We fear the large bilateral U.S. trade deﬁ cits with 
China are increasing the dangers of protectionist 
actions by Congress, which may not approve bilateral 
trade agreements recently negotiated with Korea 
and several Latin American countries, or renew the 
President’s trade promotion authority, which expired 
June 30, 2007.53  Th is authority will be critical for 
successful completion of the precarious Doha Round 
multilateral trade negotiations and for maintaining 
U.S. leadership for any subsequent trade liberalization 
eﬀ orts.54  As we enter the Presidential political cam-
paign and approach the 2008 Congressional campaigns, 
the dangers of commitments to protectionist policies 
increase, and enormous long-term damage can be done 
if candidates succumb to the temptation to advance 
protectionist policies as a response to the U.S. trade 
deﬁ cit.
As foreign direct investment and other cross-border 
trade in assets have grown rapidly, the dangers of 
ﬁ nancial protectionism also have grown.  Historically, 
the ﬂ ow of direct investment, and in large part that 
of ﬁ nancial capital, have been from advanced to less-
developed economies, and the protectionist issues have 
revolved around the rules governing acquisitions and 
equity investments in the developing world.  However, 
with the emergence of large current account, and 
sometimes capital account, surpluses and ﬁ nancial 
holdings in emerging market economies, and with the 
rapid development of ﬁ nancial and managerial exper-
tise in those economies, the possibilities and incentives 
for a reverse ﬂ ow of equity capital into the “advanced” 
countries have increased.
Th ere will likely be domestic resistance to this change 
in economic roles, just as there was resistance several 
decades ago to Japanese acquisition of U.S. properties, 
auto plants, and other assets.  Th is resistance has often 
involved national security concerns, real or imagined.  
Th e Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
States (CFIUS) is an intra-agency federal panel that 
reviews foreign acquisition of U.S. assets with regard 
to national security, and implements the authority 
of the President to suspend or prohibit transactions 
that threaten to impair U.S. national security.  After 
September 11, 2001, CFIUS scrutiny and denials 
unsurprisingly increased.  However, after the Dubai 
Ports World controversy of early 2006, CFIUS, under 
political pressure, apparently made the approval process 
more onerous and threatened to impose extremely 
large penalties on companies committing minor infrac-
tions of investment agreements; twenty bills soon were 
introduced in Congress restricting foreign investment.  
Th is created uncertainty that had the potential to 
discourage legitimate foreign investment, and cause 
other countries to restrict U.S. investment abroad.55  
As a result, Congress and the President have recently 
enacted the Foreign Investment and National Security 
Act of 2007, which establishes CFIUS by statute and 
codiﬁ es procedures to safeguard national security while 
maintaining a relatively open investment climate.56  
Although the new legislation attempts to balance the 
competing claims of national security and openness to 
investment, there nevertheless remains some danger in 
the current climate that national security may become 
an excuse for protectionist actions.
Th is issue may become more problematic, and less 
clearly a simple matter of protectionism, if U.S. or 
other private business assets become owned to any 
signiﬁ cant degree by foreign governments or quasi-
oﬃ  cial investment authorities.  Foreign exchange 
reserves invested in U.S. Treasury securities or agency 
assets earn low rates of return.  As the growth of 
foreign oﬃ  cial exchange reserves recently has acceler-
ated, more governments have created, or are exploring 
the creation of, public investment institutions to invest 
in higher earning securities, including equities, in the 
United States, Europe, and elsewhere.  Singapore and a 
number of Middle Eastern and other oil exporters have 
operated such investment authorities for some time, 
but foreign government holdings of this type may soon 
become more common and much larger.  China is now 
creating such an authority, to which it may dedicate 
$200 billion of its reserves, and Japan is reported to 
be considering one.57  Information on many of these 
funds is closely guarded, but a recent estimate puts the 
total at about $2.5 trillion – almost half as large as the 
$5.1 trillion global oﬃ  cial reserves at the end of 2006.58 
Even if such foreign investments involve only relatively 
small ownership shares of individual companies, and 
are passive and highly diversiﬁ ed, they may present 
political, and possibly substantive, diﬃ  culties.  Th e 
U.S. Treasury has begun to suggest that it is concerned 
about both foreign public ownership of private ﬁ rms 
and the possibility that such funds will reduce the 
incentive for their national owners to change exchange 
rate policies.  Furthermore, the new CFIUS procedures 
require a full-scale investigation of proposed foreign 
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government-controlled transactions, although this 
requirement can we waived by the Secretary of the 
Treasury if he ﬁ nds that that national security is not 
threatened.  Resistance in Europe to such acquisitions 
also appears to be growing.59  As one analyst recently 
has noted, “when governments own companies, that 
creates the potential for geopolitical mischief.”60 
Intergenerational Equity: Borrowing from the 
Future
Current account deﬁ cits and international borrowing 
eﬀ ectively transfer resources from future generations 
to those alive today.  If those resources are transferred 
into higher current productive investment – as was 
arguably the case in the late 1990s – future genera-
tions may beneﬁ t.  However, because consumption has 
steadily increased as a share of GDP during the period 
of rising current account deﬁ cits, it is diﬃ  cult to argue 
that the principal eﬀ ect of increased foreign borrowing 
over this period has been to increase domestic invest-
ment.  Instead, the United States in eﬀ ect has been 
transferring goods and services from future generations 
to current consumers.61  
It can be argued, of course, that such an intergenera-
tional transfer is equitable and appropriate, since future 
generations are likely to be wealthier than the current 
generation, at least in part as a result of the latter’s 
actions.  Nevertheless, in view of the oncoming rise in 
the elderly dependency burden, and associated mount-
ing tax burdens to ﬁ nance sharply rising public health 
and pension costs, we are not persuaded that “bor-
rowing against the future,” as the United States is now 
doing, is good public policy.  We also believe that the 
risks of much higher social costs likely to face future 
generations associated with, for instance, international 
terrorism, rapidly changing geopolitical conditions, 
and climate change, make it unwise to shift economic 
burdens to the future.
Large Imbalances Are Unsustainable in the 
Long Term
While there are no widely accepted estimates of a 
political or economic limit to the size of the U.S. cur-
rent account deﬁ cits or net international debt, the sheer 
arithmetic of debt dynamics when current account 
deﬁ cits are large is troubling.  Clearly, current account 
deﬁ cits cannot grow faster than GDP over an extended 
period of time.  But even large deﬁ cits that are stable 
in relation to GDP have worrisome implications.  For 
instance, were the current account deﬁ cit simply to 
continue at 6 percent of GDP, with 5 percent nominal 
GDP growth, the negative NIIP might eventually 
stabilize at 60-120 percent of GDP (depending on the 
size of valuation changes) and at about half that within 
a decade.62  Although some countries, such as Australia, 
New Zealand, Spain, Greece, and Portugal have ap-
proached such high levels of net international debt to 
GDP without negative consequences, none are large 
economies where cross-border asset holdings of this 
magnitude could have large international eﬀ ects.
With such an increase in net indebtedness, about 40 
to 80 percent of the U.S. capital stock eventually might 
be foreign owned.63  Notwithstanding the fact that 
U.S. ownership of foreign capital also would greatly 
increase, the recent political resistance to foreign own-
ership of U.S. assets in the Unocal and Dubai Ports 
World cases, and earlier in large Japanese acquisitions 
during the 1980s, suggests that such ownership would 
present political problems.  Such problems might be 
exacerbated if such foreign ownership involved govern-
ments, as noted above.
However, even such a large sustained current account 
deﬁ cit would not accommodate a large sustainable 
trade deﬁ cit.  Because the increasingly negative net for-
eign investment position would continually reduce the 
balance on capital income, the trade deﬁ cit would have 
to fall, and eventually move into surplus to ﬁ nance an 
ever-larger income deﬁ cit if the current account deﬁ cit 
were not increasing.
Such considerations indicate that the current account 
deﬁ cit eventually must fall substantially.  As noted 
above, the impact of large trade and transfer deﬁ cits on 
the U.S. net foreign debt has been greatly reduced – by 
a remarkable 64 percent during 1983-2006 – by the 
higher rates of return (broadly deﬁ ned to include valu-
ation changes) on U.S. foreign assets compared with its 
liabilities.  An IMF analysis shows that in 2001-2006, 
this return diﬀ erential more than oﬀ set the enormous 
increase in net foreign debt of 28.2 percent of GDP 
that would have resulted from the U.S. trade deﬁ cit 
taken alone.  Australia and Spain, which were not 
blessed with such diﬀ erential returns, saw their trade 
deﬁ cits fully reﬂ ected in sharply rising net external 
debt.  As the IMF points out, it would be unrealistic 
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to expect the U.S. return diﬀ erential to remain large 
enough to obviate the need for reduction in the current 
account deﬁ cit.64
How far the current account deﬁ cit would have to fall 
to be sustainable in the medium term is diﬃ  cult to 
determine, because this depends on many factors – in-
cluding the growth rate of the economy, rates of return 
on cross-border asset holdings, and especially the 
growth of demand for dollar assets.  However, several 
analysts, including those at the IMF, have estimated 
that a current account deﬁ cit of very roughly 3 percent 
of GDP would be sustainable, requiring a reduction of 
about half from its current level of about 6 percent of 
GDP.65  Indeed, given the attractiveness of the United 
States for both portfolio and direct investment, it 
could be diﬃ  cult to reduce the current account deﬁ cit 
much further.  It follows from the discussion above, 
however, that a reduction of the current account deﬁ cit 
by 3 percent of GDP would require a substantially 
larger reduction in the trade deﬁ cit, because the growth 
of U.S. external debt will cause the deﬁ cit on capital 
income to grow.
Adjustment and the Reduction of 
Imbalances
Th e Idealized Adjustment Mechanism
If large imbalances must eventually fall, through what 
process of economic adjustment will this happen?  
Ideally, adjustment would take place in a smooth and 
gradual manner in which the large saving-investment 
“mismatches” described above were reduced by an 
incremental shift of global demand from deﬁ cit coun-
tries to surplus countries.  Th is demand shift would be 
facilitated by changes in relative prices, largely through 
real exchange rate adjustments.  (Figure 15 shows how 
the U.S. trade deﬁ cit has responded to changes in the 
real exchange rate during the last several decades.)  
In the United States, as the growth of domestic de-
mand slowed, national saving would rise, bringing 
overall spending growth more in line with that of 
output.  In the ideal case, actual output and employ-
ment would not be signiﬁ cantly reduced; the demand 
for and production of exports and import substitutes 
would rise, in response to exchange rate and price 
adjustments, as those for non-tradable goods fell.  In 
Figure 15.  U.S. Current Account Balance and Inflation-Adjusted Value of the Dollar, 1975-2006
(Trade-Weighted Basis)
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general, in economies with current account surpluses, 
the reverse adjustments would take place.  National 
saving would fall as domestic demand grew faster than 
output; in response to relative price changes, demand 
would shift away from exports and import-substitutes 
towards imports and non-tradable goods and services.  
Th e overall eﬀ ect would be to increase net exports and 
the current account balance in the United States, and 
to reduce net exports and the current account balances 
in surplus countries.
For this smooth adjustment to take place, both the 
changes in domestic demand and the relative price 
adjustments are necessary – a point often missing in 
popular discussion.66  A reduction in U.S. total spend-
ing large enough to reduce substantially the current 
account deﬁ cit without the price adjustments needed to 
shift demand to exports and import-substitutes would 
involve a severe recession.  (For instance, without price 
adjustments, a fall in GDP of roughly 11 percent and 
rise in unemployment of about 4.5 percentage points 
would be required to reduce imports and the trade 
deﬁ cit by 3 percent of GDP.)67  Similarly, in the surplus 
countries, higher total expenditures alone, without the 
price adjustments needed to shift demand to imports, 
would produce inﬂ ationary pressures, unless the 
economy were already operating below capacity.  In a 
similar manner, exchange rate and relative price adjust-
ments alone, without the shifts in demand, also would 
be problematic.  Th e depreciation of the dollar in itself 
would be inﬂ ationary in the United States, shifting 
demand from imports to domestic sectors; a reduction 
in spending would thus be needed to “make room” for 
this shift in demand and prevent inﬂ ation.  Similarly, in 
the surplus countries, an appreciation of the currency 
in itself would be deﬂ ationary, shifting demand from 
domestic sectors to imports; an increase in spending 
would then be required to sustain output.
Is smooth market-driven adjustment that roughly 
follows this ideal model likely?  Market participants 
presumably do not expect large imbalances and the 
rapid accumulation of dollar liabilities to be sustained 
indeﬁ nitely, and will come to expect adjustment, 
including further depreciation of the dollar, higher 
saving in the United States, and strengthening demand 
abroad.  If those expectations are realized, and the 
dollar falls as anticipated, with no major unfavorable 
economic or policy shocks, asset prices and interest 
rates will incorporate and validate those expectations, 
and the imbalances will fall.  Th is may be the most 
likely path for adjustment, and former Federal Reserve 
Chairman Alan Greenspan and others have projected 
such a benign outcome.68  
Indeed, some important components of this market-
driven adjustment process are underway.  By July 2007 
the dollar had fallen by about 18 percent from its 
peak of early 2002; and by late 2006 and early 2007 
the trade balance in non-petroleum goods was falling, 
after an expected lag.  By May 2007 the monthly trade 
deﬁ cit had fallen by $7.6 billion from its August 2006 
peak of $67.6 billion, although about 40 percent of the 
improvement in the goods balance was in the petro-
leum category.  Total spending growth in the United 
States has slowed with the end of the housing boom.  
Private saving should begin to rise with the ﬂ attening 
of housing values; and the public saving outlook has 
improved with stronger state and local economies and 
unexpectedly strong federal revenues.  In the meantime, 
growth in Europe and Japan has been strengthening 
and that in China remains very strong, albeit driven by 
surging exports.  Large investment projects are moving 
forward in the oil exporting countries, as they adjust to 
the recent surge in export earnings and reserves.
Looking further ahead, we might expect to see some 
diminution of private saving in Europe, Japan, and 
China as those societies age, and a reduction in sav-
ing and restoration of stronger investment in other 
developing Asian economies as precautionary saving 
and reserve accumulation moderate, and memories of 
the 1998 crisis recede.  As the accumulation of large 
dollar reserves increases inﬂ ationary pressures and 
problems of monetary management in China, further 
gradual appreciation of the renminbi and liberalization 
of the capital account are likely, and the development 
of ﬁ nancial markets and institutions will also boost 
consumption.69
Impediments to Smooth Adjustment
Unfortunately, in spite of these encouraging signs, the 
further progress and successful completion of this 
market-driven adjustment process faces some major 
obstacles.
As noted above, adjustment is likely to be smooth – 
i.e. dollar depreciation will proceed in a gradual and 
orderly process – if investors’ expectations are aligned 
with the changes that will in fact be required to reduce 
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the imbalances.  Although this is quite likely if poli-
cies are well managed and there are no shocks to the 
system, it is by no means foreordained.  In particular, if 
large current account deﬁ cits continue over an extended 
period of time, investors may become myopic, heav-
ily discounting the need for a future large deprecia-
tion that may become even larger as the imbalances 
continue.  In these circumstances, when a large fall in 
the dollar begins, it may turn into a “dollar plunge” as 
investors are “surprised” by the market.70 
It appears unlikely that market forces will rebalance 
global demand and the saving-investment mismatches 
anytime soon.  Th e April 2007 IMF baseline projec-
tion for 2007-2012 (assuming no additional eﬀ ective 
exchange rate adjustment) shows the U.S. current 
account deﬁ cit continuing for ﬁ ve years at more than 
1.5 percent of world GDP, with correspondingly large 
surpluses continuing in Japan, China, and elsewhere 
in Asia; the oil exporters’ surpluses adjust downward 
slightly but remain very large.71  Even when assuming 
substantial eﬀ ective exchange rate adjustment (includ-
ing that for China, where it is produced by inﬂ ation), 
a 2006 IMF “no policy change” projection shows the 
U.S. current account deﬁ cit falling only very slowly to 
about 4 percent of U.S. GDP in 2015.  In this scenario, 
U.S. net foreign liabilities rise to 55 percent of GDP, 
trending toward 85 percent in the long run, while the 
dollar share of foreign portfolios increases.  Th e IMF 
warns that this approximate tripling of U.S. net foreign 
liabilities relative to GDP without foreign investors 
demanding a large risk premium in higher interest rates 
may be unrealistic.  Th e analysis of incongruent expec-
tations noted above also suggests that the low real rates 
of return that foreigners receive on dollar assets imply a 
potential for disorderly adjustment.72
It is unclear what role oﬃ  cial dollar holdings might 
play under these circumstances.  Th ere generally has 
been large inertia in oﬃ  cial reserve holdings, and the 
dollar’s position as a reserve currency has remained 
relatively stable, in spite of the gradual emergence of 
the euro as a credible alternative.73  It is probably un-
likely that foreign monetary authorities would initiate 
large and abrupt dollar sales, and in response to a ﬂ ight 
from the dollar by private investors, they might in fact 
increase their reserve holdings to stabilize the dollar.  
However, oﬃ  cial holders of dollars, although certainly 
having diﬀ erent objectives than private investors, may 
be politically sensitive to the drop in the value of their 
reserves, measured in local or non-dollar currencies, 
that they would incur through a large dollar deprecia-
tion.  If they see an eventual large depreciation of the 
dollar as inevitable, the possibility that some would 
follow private investors in reducing dollar holdings in 
their portfolios, if only by slowing the rate of accumu-
lation, cannot be dismissed.74  Even if oﬃ  cial reserve 
holders do not attempt to diversify out of dollars, the 
fear among private investors that they may do so can 
add to uncertainty and increase volatility in the ex-
change markets.75
A second critical impediment to adjustment may be the 
unwillingness, or incapacity, of policymakers to imple-
ment policies to facilitate it, such as public expenditure 
reductions or tax increases in the United States or 
exchange rate appreciation to increase imports and 
consumption in China.  Such policy paralysis not only 
allows the problem to grow as net debtor and credi-
tor positions increase, but may also erode conﬁ dence 
among private investors that policy changes and correc-
tion will be forthcoming.  It is not surprising that poli-
cymakers are less than eager to undertake such changes, 
because adjustment is likely to impose some painful 
costs, at least in the short run.76  Americans, long ac-
customed to spending more than they produce collec-
tively, would increase their spending less (privately and 
publicly), and on average experience a lower growth 
in living standards, even if their incomes did not fall.  
Reducing the trade and current account deﬁ cits by 3 
percent of GDP, or about $420 billion, would involve 
a reduction in domestic purchases of roughly $1,400 
per capita (at any given exchange rate) – and a further 
loss of purchasing power of perhaps $700 to $1,100 
per capita as a result of the higher import prices from 
a 20-30 percent nominal eﬀ ective dollar depreciation.77  
In the surplus countries, although expenditures and 
consumption per capita would increase, other aspects 
of the adjustment could be diﬃ  cult.  Th e reduction in 
saving in high-saving societies such as China would go 
against long-ingrained patterns of behavior, and reallo-
cating demand and output from the export to domestic 
sectors in export-oriented economies like China, Japan, 
and Germany might prove unwelcome and diﬃ  cult.78 
Policymakers may also be reluctant to act because of 
the real-world diﬃ  culties of reallocating resources 
and demand internally.  China, as a premier example, 
has developed an export-oriented economic growth 
strategy that has created unprecedented increases in 
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output and living standards.  Nevertheless, excessive 
and ineﬃ  cient investment, rising income disparities, 
and other problems led the Chinese leadership in 2004 
to announce a new policy direction that would shift 
from investment and exports towards consumption-led 
growth.  However, few of the policy changes required 
for this change appear to have been implemented.  
Modifying the existing structure, even if necessary and 
in China’s interest in the longer term, is apparently 
proving very diﬃ  cult for risk-averse policymakers con-
cerned with the dangers of social unrest – particularly 
as the growth in industrial employment has recently 
slowed.79  Similar considerations, in less dramatic form, 
apply to other Asian developing economies and some 
advanced countries such as Japan and Germany.  Even 
in a highly ﬂ exible economy such as the United States, 
large and potentially disruptive changes in the exchange 
rate and relative prices may be required for internal 
adjustment.80
Finally, even if policymakers are prepared to act, an 
adjustment without signiﬁ cant economic dislocations 
requires roughly compensating changes in saving 
and investment patterns between deﬁ cit and surplus 
economies that produce a shift, but not an overall 
reduction, in global demand.  For example, an increase 
in public saving in the United States would likely 
reduce output and employment (both in the United 
States and abroad) if not accompanied by a reduction 
in saving and increase in domestic demand abroad.  In 
practice, policy coordination of this kind faces formi-
dable obstacles.  It implies a measure of agreement on 
policy actions that may not exist, as well as a facility 
for ﬁ ne-tuning and timely actions that governments 
may not possess.  In addition, the appropriate policies 
for reducing external imbalances may conﬂ ict with the 
pursuit of other goals.  For example, ﬁ scal expansion 
in Japan and Germany confronts the realities of large 
ﬁ scal deﬁ cits and the need for ﬁ scal consolidation, and 
euro area ﬁ scal policies generally are constrained by the 
Stability and Growth Pact.  We examine the implica-
tions of these problems of policy coordination in our 
discussion of policy recommendations in Part V, below.
Th e Costs of Disorderly Adjustment
What would be the impact on the U.S. economy of an 
abrupt decline in the demand for dollars, and a sharp 
drop in the exchange rate?  Th e eﬀ ects are extremely 
uncertain.  Depreciation in itself would increase total 
demand, but this eﬀ ect is likely to occur only after a 
lag of more than a year.  Th e danger is that the sharp 
reduction of capital inﬂ ows, and possibly action by 
the Federal Reserve to forestall inﬂ ation originating 
in higher import prices, would raise interest rates and 
more immediately reduce demand in housing, consum-
er durables, and other sensitive sectors.  In spite of the 
ﬂ exibility and resilience of the U.S. economy, this could 
produce a recession, especially if overlaid on existing 
weakness in the housing sector.
History does not provide reliable guidance on this 
question.  Th e experiences of other economies (and 
especially developing countries) may not provide strong 
evidence because (unlike the United States) they often 
have had to borrow in foreign currency, so that the 
domestic currency value of liabilities has been increased 
by depreciation.81  Nevertheless, a recent study of the 
experience with current account reversals in relatively 
large countries found large impacts on real output, 
with per capita growth declining by about 2-4 percent 
in the ﬁ rst year and remaining under trend even three 
years later.82  It also appears that the reversals of larger 
deﬁ cits, and deﬁ cits ﬁ nancing consumption – both 
characteristics of the current United States situation – 
are associated with larger depreciations, longer adjust-
ment periods, and slower growth.83
Th e history of adjustments by the United States is 
limited and mixed.  Th e large dollar overvaluation of 
the mid-1980s, and the current account deﬁ cits that 
reached 3.4 percent of GDP in 1987, gave rise to 
ominous warnings of their economic dangers.84  Yet 
those imbalances were reversed by policy adjustments 
in the G-7 countries, and a sharp drop in the dollar 
facilitated by coordinated currency intervention, with-
out a U.S. recession.85  On the other hand, the United 
States experience with sharp dollar depreciation after 
the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971-
1973 was much more painful, although it is diﬃ  cult to 
disentangle the eﬀ ects of that adjustment from those of 
the “oil shock” and the policies responding to it.  In any 
event, the accompanying ﬂ ight from the dollar probably 
contributed signiﬁ cantly to the sharp rise in nominal 
interest rates and inﬂ ation, and the deep 1974-1975 
recession that followed.86
Economic model simulations suggest that adjustment 
triggered by a reduction in the desire to hold dollar 
assets could have large repercussions on the U.S. and 
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global economies.  In an IMF “disruptive adjustment 
scenario,” such a decline in the appetite for dollars 
produces abrupt exchange rate changes, higher inﬂ a-
tion and interest rates worldwide, and sharp reductions 
(roughly 3 percentage points) in economic growth in 
the United States and emerging Asia, including China.  
Th e IMF notes that these outcomes could be much 
worse if the abrupt exchange rate adjustments disrupt-
ed ﬁ nancial markets.87  In the event of such disruption, 
the now very large international markets for derivatives, 
and other instruments of intermediation, could be 
stabilizing or destabilizing, but add another element of 
uncertainty and risk.88  
Th e IMF recently conducted a systematic study of 42 
reversals of large and sustained current account deﬁ cits 
in advanced countries during 1960-2006.  Th e costs 
of adjustment, in terms of the impact on economic 
growth, unemployed capacity, and investment varied 
widely.  At one end of the spectrum, a quarter of the 
episodes involved substantial growth slowdowns, which 
averaged 3.5 percent per year, and a strong decline in 
investment rates.  On the other end, a quarter of the 
reversals were expansionary, with increases in annual 
output growth averaging about 0.75 percent and with 
sustained investment rates.  Importantly, these more 
successful expansionary reversals tended to occur when 
relatively large real exchange rate depreciation was 
combined with substantial ﬁ scal consolidation that 
raised saving and thereby allowed investment to be 
sustained.89
We believe this evidence suggests that disorderly ad-
justment, while at present unlikely, presents risks that 
are too large to ignore.  It also indicates that measures 
to facilitate orderly adjustment, by rebalancing global 
demand and encouraging exchange rate ﬂ exibility, can 
be useful and should be pursued.  Furthermore, we 
note that the magnitude of potential exchange rate 
changes and of unfavorable impacts on output, em-
ployment, inﬂ ation, and ﬁ nancial markets is likely to 
be greater as the size of the imbalance grows.  In this 
context, the ease with which the U.S. current account 
deﬁ cit has been ﬁ nanced poses a dilemma.  As two 
astute observers have graphically put it, the “adjustment 
will be sharper the longer is the initial rope that global 
capital markets oﬀ er the United States.”90  We confront 
a diﬃ  cult trade-oﬀ :  It is desirable that adjustment be 
gradual to diminish the costs it imposes, but the longer 
adjustment is postponed, the greater these costs are 
likely to be.  Th is implies that delay in adjustment is un-
desirable, and therefore that policies to facilitate adjustment 
should be undertaken promptly – the subject to which we 
now turn.
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In Part IV we outlined the dangers of protection-
ism and ﬁ nancial and economic instability associated 
with large and growing international imbalances.  We 
acknowledged that markets eventually respond and ad-
just to such imbalances and, indeed, that some positive 
movement in the adjustment process has already taken 
place.  We noted, however, that many of the major 
structural sources of the imbalances, and the associated 
risks, persist; and while the system may adjust under 
“benign neglect” without signiﬁ cant policy interven-
tions, the prudent course is to “buy some insurance” by 
implementing policies that will reduce those risks.
We also found that there is great uncertainty both 
about the level of imbalances (and the U.S. current ac-
count deﬁ cit) that is sustainable, and about the size of 
the macroeconomic policy and exchange rate changes, 
and the time frame, needed to reach such a level.  We 
believe that it will be useful to aim for the “soft target” 
of a U.S. current account deﬁ cit of about 3 percent of 
GDP within a few years, which is a level at which U.S. 
external debt might stabilize as a percentage of GDP 
in the medium term.vii  However, our most important 
objective should not be eventually to reach a “magic 
number,” but to implement soon policy changes that 
will reduce imbalances and create conﬁ dence that 
orderly adjustment is proceeding.  In this section we 
outline in general terms the policy changes that we 
believe will facilitate such an adjustment to a world of 
smaller and less rapidly growing imbalances.
The General Policy Framework: Three 
Principles
CED believes that three basic principles are essential to 
an eﬀ ective policy framework:
• All economies should contribute to adjustment;
• Changes in both total spending and relative prices 
are required; and
V.  Facilitating Adjustment: CED’s Policy 
Recommendations
• A multilateral cooperative approach is more likely 
to be successful.
All Economies Should Contribute to Adjustment
International economic and ﬁ nancial stability is a 
public good, beneﬁ ting all countries that participate in 
the international system.  It is therefore reasonable to 
expect that all countries pay some regard to the eﬀ ects 
of their policies on other countries and on the system 
as a whole.  (Th is principle, of course, is codiﬁ ed in, for 
instance, the rules of the World Trade Organization 
and the Articles of Agreement of the International 
Monetary Fund.)  Such responsibilities are especially 
important for large economies such as the United 
States, Japan, the European Union, and China, whose 
actions have major systemic implications.  However, as 
we note below, the actions of many smaller economies, 
taken in the aggregate, can have an important impact, 
so their policies also should contribute to adjustment.
Policy adjustments also should be broadly shared 
because the international economy is a closed system.  
A reduction in the U.S. current account deﬁ cit, or a re-
duction in the Chinese current account surplus, implies 
an equivalent change in current account balances in 
other countries.  It is incorrect to point (as some do) to 
a single country’s large surplus or deﬁ cit as being “the” 
source of the problem, or of the solution.
Finally, although policy measures to reduce imbalances, 
by reducing the risk of disorderly adjustment that 
could aﬀ ect many countries, are likely to beneﬁ t most 
or all countries, they also entail costs, as noted in Part 
IV.  Th ey are therefore more likely to be acceptable, 
and implemented, if adjustment is broadly shared.  We 
recognize, however, that compelling domestic problems, 
or other constraints on policy, may limit the contribu-
tions to adjustment that some countries can make.
vii Th e level at which the current account deﬁ cit stabilizes depends critically upon the rate of increase in the deﬁ cit on income payments and the reduction 
in the trade deﬁ cit, which would have to decline enough to allow the former to be ﬁ nanced.
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Changes in Both Total Spending And Relative Prices 
Are Required
“Finger-pointing” at a particular country as the source 
of the imbalances often is associated with a view that 
only inappropriate macroeconomic policies, or, alterna-
tively, only inappropriate exchange rates, are responsi-
ble.  Some Europeans would blame the problem simply 
on U.S. ﬁ scal deﬁ cits or (alternatively) an undervalued 
yen; some U.S. policy makers claim that Chinese ex-
change rate policy is the sole culprit; while the Chinese 
authorities have sometimes pointed to U.S. spending, 
arguing that exchange rates do not matter.
We believe that, in practice as in theory, changes in 
both domestic demand, which directly aﬀ ect the 
saving-investment balance, and in relative prices, 
principally through real exchange rate changes, will be 
required for orderly adjustment.  As noted in Part IV, 
in the absence of a rebalancing of domestic demand, 
often assisted by macroeconomic policies, exchange rate 
adjustments will have to be larger, and are more likely 
to “overshoot,” raising the risk of ﬁ nancial and economic 
disruption.  Similarly, shifts in domestic demand with-
out changes in exchange rates and relative prices are 
likely to reduce output and employment or, conversely, 
create inﬂ ationary pressures.
An eﬀ ective program for international adjustment will 
therefore involve many countries in both policy changes 
that aﬀ ect domestic demand and policy- or market-
driven exchange rate adjustments.  In very broad, 
general terms, countries with persistent, structural 
(i.e. non-cyclical) deﬁ cits – preeminently the United 
States – should reduce the growth of overall spending 
relative to output, while allowing eﬀ ective exchange rate 
depreciation.  By the same token, those with structural 
surpluses should attempt to increase the growth of 
demand relative to that of output, while allowing ex-
change rates to appreciate.  As noted, the circumstances 
of individual countries may constrain the extent and 
timing of these policy adjustments, but we urge that 
policymakers not allow such circumstances to become 
rationalizations for inaction on adjustment.
A Multilateral Cooperative Approach Is More Likely 
to Be Successful
International adjustment presents a collective action 
problem.  A single country, taking adjustment actions 
alone, may produce economic results signiﬁ cantly 
inferior to those that would result from actions taken 
collectively by several countries.  Fiscal tightening in 
the United States may reduce output and employment 
both domestically and globally unless accompanied by 
an expansion of demand abroad with complementary 
exchange rate adjustments.  Th e Japanese, Chinese, 
and many Europeans worry that currency appreciation 
and U.S. ﬁ scal tightening will weaken export demand, 
with unfavorable domestic repercussions.  Some of 
these problems, of course, will require compensatory 
domestic policy actions, but some can be ameliorated 
by actions taken abroad.  In the absence of actions by 
others, there may be less incentive for countries to act 
themselves.
In most instances, the policy changes needed for 
adjustment are those that countries should undertake 
in their own self-interest, at least in the longer term.  
However, these policies may also be politically diﬃ  cult, 
as witnessed by the diﬃ  culty in reducing the U.S. ﬁ scal 
deﬁ cit or modestly appreciating the renminbi.  Just as 
WTO rules protect to a degree liberal trade arrange-
ments from protectionist pressures, a multilateral 
framework may facilitate adjustment policies, both 
by creating a sense of shared burden and by oﬀ ering a 
protective rationale to political leaders.
We consider below the most suitable approach to mul-
tilateral coordination.  As a foundation, we ﬁ rst present 
our recommendations on the actions by the United 
States and other countries that would be most helpful 
in facilitating adjustment.  However, it is important to 
note here that we do not regard these recommenda-
tions as a rigid, hard-wired, comprehensive program to 
be implemented with exquisitely coordinated simulta-
neity by many countries.  Th at would be quite unreal-
istic – technically, economically, and politically.  Our 
recommendations should rather be seen as directional 
objectives, likely to be implemented over a period of 
several years, with some participants more constrained 
in their contributions than others.
Policies in the United States
With its extremely large current account deﬁ cit, the 
United States is central to international adjustment.  
Th e United States should lead by example with its 
own policies to facilitate adjustment while actively 
encouraging and supporting adjustment policies by 
others.  It is very important that this leadership be 
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exercised in multilateral coordination eﬀ orts as well as 
in domestic policies.  We believe the U.S. adjustment 
policies outlined below, as part of a larger global adjust-
ment over several years, could reduce the U.S. current 
account deﬁ cit to the approximately 3 percent of GDP 
that could be sustained in the medium term without 
signiﬁ cant risks.
First, What Not to Do:  Protectionism
Often when the United States has experienced large 
trade deﬁ cits, and especially large bilateral deﬁ cits, 
some elements of the public and Congress have called 
for tariﬀ s or other barriers to reduce imports, especially 
when domestic employment has seemed adversely 
aﬀ ected or threatened.  In this trade cycle, the admin-
istration has recently imposed new restrictions by 
changing the rules governing countervailing duties on 
imports from “non-market” economies (preeminently 
China).  Such protectionist barriers are unlikely to be 
eﬀ ective in reducing the trade deﬁ cit, especially when 
levied against a single country that has third-country 
competitors.  More importantly, such measures would 
reduce the large beneﬁ ts that Americans have gained 
from liberal trade and investment policies and risk 
provoking retaliatory measures that could halt progress 
towards further liberalization or even escalate into a 
spiral of no-win trade conﬂ ict.
As noted in Part III, as foreign direct investment and 
other cross-border trade in assets have grown, the dan-
gers of ﬁ nancial protectionism have increased.  Th ere 
are three strong reasons for the United States to resist 
ﬁ nancial protectionism.  First, like trade protection, it 
harms eﬃ  cient international resource allocation and, 
in general, reduces welfare in both the United States 
and the capital exporter.  Second, the United States 
will depend upon imports of capital to assist a smooth 
adjustment process as the current account deﬁ cit falls; 
impediments to capital inﬂ ows could impair that pro-
cess and, in any case, would raise the cost of borrowing 
abroad.  Finally, over the longer term, the consump-
tion needs of older populations in the United States 
and other advanced countries may require very large 
resource transfers (capital imports) from younger, more 
rapidly growing, higher-saving countries.  Th is presum-
ably will involve the large-scale foreign acquisition of 
many kinds of U.S. assets; the United States will need 
to adjust to these economic and demographic facts of 
life.
CED therefore strongly urges the Congress, the admin-
istration, and all political candidates to resist pressures 
to embrace policies of trade and ﬁ nancial protection-
ism.  In particular:
• Congress should restore the President’s expired 
Trade Promotion Authority, which is essential for 
completion of the much-endangered Doha Round 
of multilateral negotiations, and for any future 
progress in trade liberalization;
• Th e administration should work vigorously to 
complete the Doha Round, and Congress should 
approve the bilateral trade agreements with Korea 
and various Latin American countries that are now 
pending;
• Th e administration and Congress should employ 
the new CFIUS procedures carefully and use them 
to prohibit or reduce foreign investment in the 
United States only when such use is clearly war-
ranted by national security requirements.91
Increase National Saving*
A reduction of the U.S. current account deﬁ cit to 
roughly 3 percent of GDP must involve an ex post re-
duction of total spending relative to output (increase in 
national saving) of this amount.  Th e current slowdown 
in the economy following the collapse of the housing 
boom is producing slower growth in both spending and 
output, and this slowdown should lead to a reduction 
in imports.  However, reduction of the trade deﬁ cit 
through recession, which would be both costly and 
temporary, is obviously not the answer.  Th e United 
States needs domestic policies to raise national sav-
ing – the indispensable U.S. obligation in multilateral 
adjustment – combined with the further depreciation of 
the dollar and strong demand growth abroad that will 
support U.S. output and employment.
If the United States does not take measures to increase 
national saving, adjustment may take place through 
dollar depreciation alone, which would create inﬂ ation-
ary pressures.  Th is would probably force the Federal 
Reserve to raise interest rates, which would “crowd 
out” productive investment.  Th is is not an attractive 
solution and would likely be unsustainable, requiring 
eventual policy adjustments to raise national saving – 
that should have been made earlier with deliberation.
* See Memorandum, page 46.
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CED believes, as we have argued previously, that the 
most reliable policy for increasing national saving is a 
reduction in the federal budget deﬁ cit.92  Although the 
near-term U.S. ﬁ scal outlook has improved recently due 
to unexpectedly rapid revenue growth, budget projec-
tions based on a continuation of current policies, plus 
an extension of tax cuts scheduled to expire and in-
dexation of the alternative minimum tax, show uniﬁ ed 
budget deﬁ cits of about 1.5-2 percent of GDP in 2012 
rising to about 2.5 percent of GDP in 2017, followed 
by a far more rapid rise in the subsequent decade.  
Th ese uniﬁ ed deﬁ cits, however, include the social secu-
rity “surplus,” which peaks in about 2017 and declines 
sharply thereafter, thereby masking the true long-term 
ﬁ scal outlook.  Excluding social security, projected “on-
budget” deﬁ cits rise to about 3-3.5 percent of GDP in 
2012 and about 3.5-4 percent of GDP in 2017.93  We 
recommend that these on-budget deﬁ cits be eliminated 
within ﬁ ve years.  International imbalances aside, this 
is necessary on domestic grounds to prepare ﬁ scally for 
the impending extreme pressures that will arise from 
increases in health-care costs and population aging, 
which are projected to raise Social Security, Medicare, 
and Medicaid expenditures from 7.8 percent of GDP 
currently to about 10-12 percent in 2017 and 15-20 
percent in 2030, under current policies.94
Elimination of these deﬁ cits will require a comprehen-
sive program of ﬁ scal restraint, undertaken without de-
lay.  Th is is not the place for a detailed budget proposal, 
but we believe such a program must include reductions 
in the growth of all catgories of spending – including 
defense, homeland security, and domestic spending.  A 
more rigorous prioritization of defense programs will 
be necessary, and homeland security expenditures must 
be allocated more eﬃ  ciently, with less inﬂ uence from 
political considerations.95  On the domestic side, large 
reductions will require reforms in the major entitle-
ment programs of Medicare, Medicaid, and Social 
Security, although other programs, such as agricultural 
subsidies, certainly can and should be reduced.  CED 
has previously made proposals for entitlement reforms, 
which we believe should be included in such a ﬁ scal 
program.96
Th ere are strong arguments in principle for preferring 
spending reductions to tax increases in reducing the 
ﬁ scal deﬁ cit.  However, in practice, given the very large 
increases in spending projected under current policies, 
it is most unlikely that spending reductions alone can 
reach these ﬁ scal objectives.  A signiﬁ cant increase in 
revenues is thus likely to be necessary, although the 
United States must not allow tax increases to become 
its “ﬁ rst resort.”
On tax policy, the United States should ﬁ rst do no 
harm and not enact legislation that actually reduces net 
revenues.  CED reaﬃ  rms its view that any reduction in 
revenues below those provided in current law, such as 
reform of the Alternative Minimum Tax or extension 
of the 2001-2004 tax cuts, should be “paid for” with 
other revenue increases.  In this context, we welcome 
Congress’s reinstatement of the so-called “PAYGO” 
provisions in its budget procedures.viii  With respect to 
additional revenue sources, there are several options 
that merit attention:
• Th e current income tax system is complex, inef-
ﬁ cient, and inequitable.  CED has proposed a tax 
reform agenda that would improve the income tax 
system and supplement its revenues with a value 
added-tax (VAT).  (Such a VAT, which would be 
rebated on exports under WTO rules, might also 
raise exports directly.)97  Th e administration and 
others also have made tax reform proposals, which 
could be modiﬁ ed to provide additional revenues.98
• Large petroleum net imports now account for 
roughly one-third of the U.S. trade deﬁ cit.  
Increased energy taxation, especially on carbon 
fuels, would directly strengthen the trade balance, 
indirectly improve the U.S. energy security posi-
tion, and begin to address the problem of climate 
change.
CED has not in general been enthusiastic about tax 
incentives to increase private saving, which we believe 
are unlikely to raise national saving signiﬁ cantly after 
accounting for asset substitution and their revenue 
eﬀ ects.  However, there are now several innovative 
mechanisms targeted on low- and middle-income 
viii  Th ese “Pay-As-You-Go” (PAYGO) provisions require that legislation that reduces revenues or increases entitlement spending also include provisions 
to oﬀ set these deﬁ cit-increasing changes with additional revenues or reductions in entitlement spending.
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workers that hold more promise for raising private sav-
ing, and CED recommends their consideration:
• Adopt “automatic” 401(k)s.  Legislation enacted 
in 2006 allows employers to change the default 
options for 401(k) plans from “opt-in” to “opt-out,” 
providing automatic enrollment and automatic 
escalation of contributions when earnings increase.  
Automatic payroll enrollment in IRAs should also 
be made available for workers without access to 
401(k)s.
• Modify the Savers Credit.  Th e credit is currently 
non-refundable (thereby excluding about 50 mil-
lion low-income households with no income tax 
liability) and has a complex three-tier rate struc-
ture covering annual incomes up to $50,000.  A 
refundable credit at a uniform 50 percent rate, with 
perhaps a slightly higher eligibility ceiling, would 
be more eﬀ ective.
Such changes are estimated to have powerful eﬀ ects on 
saving behavior.  Taken together, they could increase 
national saving by about 0.6 percent of GDP.99  Th e 
combination of these measures and the ﬁ scal policy 
changes recommended above could increase national 
saving (allowing for oﬀ sets in private saving) by roughly 
3 percent of GDP by 2012.
Depreciation of the Dollar
Between February 2002 (when the dollar adjustment 
began) and July 2007, the real eﬀ ective exchange rate of 
the dollar has fallen by about 18 percent.100  However, 
this depreciation has taken place predominately against 
the euro, sterling, and the Canadian dollar.  In real 
terms, the yen has actually fallen against the dollar 
during this period, while the renminbi is approximately 
unchanged, as are a number of other Asian currencies 
linked in diﬀ ering degrees to the dollar.  In addition, 
most of the dollar depreciation occurred during 2002-
2004; the dollar then rose in 2005 before resuming its 
decline in 2006-2007.
It is quite uncertain how much further the dollar will 
need to fall as the trade balance adjusts.  Th e IMF 
report on the 2006 Article IV consultations put the 
range of likely adjustment at 15-35 percent, while some 
recent studies show somewhat lower depreciations of 
roughly 10-20 percent in the context of global adjust-
ments that would reduce the U.S. current account 
deﬁ cit to 3 percent of GDP.101  Recent IMF research 
suggests that the required U.S. depreciation may be 
smaller than previously believed, because of method-
ological problems with earlier studies.102  As noted in 
Part IV above, the required depreciation will be smaller 
to the degree that supportive policies are adopted and 
the period of adjustment is longer, to permit changes in 
the structure of production.
Th e United States, as the key currency country, should 
not actively intervene in the exchange markets under 
normal circumstances.  Further, the United States 
should urge other countries to refrain from intervening 
to prevent market-driven exchange rate adjustment 
and, if both parties recognize the need for sizable 
adjustment, might note the need for such adjustment in 
its public statements.  (See below in relation to Japan.)
Finally, if ﬁ scal policy is tightened to support the 
adjustment process, as we recommend, monetary policy 
can be somewhat easier in seeking non-inﬂ ationary 
growth than it otherwise would be, which will tend to 
assist depreciation and relative price adjustment and to 
sustain investment.
Our recommended reduction of the U.S. current 
account deﬁ cit by about 3 percent of GDP would be 
somewhat smaller than the 3.4 percent experienced 
during the 1987-1991 adjustment episode, and might 
take place over a slightly longer period of time.  Such a 
reduction corresponds to approximately a one percent 
reduction in demand for the rest of the world, which 
would be spread over several years.  We believe that this 
reduction of U.S. demand in the global economy, taken 
oﬀ  a rising trend, could be absorbed by the rest of the 
world, especially if (as we recommend) further mea-
sures were taken to increase demand abroad.  In any 
case, reductions in the U.S. budget deﬁ cit to prepare 
for the future are imperative as a matter of domestic 
policy.
Policies in Other Countries
Detailed recommendations for the adjustment poli-
cies of other countries can be best developed by those 
countries, most usefully as they participate in the mul-
tilateral consultations recommended at the end of this 
section.  However, we do indicate below the direction 
and broad parameters of policy changes that would be 
helpful to adjustment.
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Europe
As a general matter, Europe should recognize that it 
needs to participate in the adjustment process, and 
that responsibility does not rest only with the United 
States, as the largest deﬁ cit country, or the Japanese and 
Chinese, with substantially undervalued currencies.
It will be helpful if European countries pursue policies 
to strengthen domestic demand while the U.S. tighten-
ing of ﬁ scal policy reduces our economy’s contribution 
to global demand.  In this context, it is encouraging to 
see the apparent improvement in growth in Germany 
and some other European countries, although much of 
this recent growth is related to higher exports.  We rec-
ognize that expansionary ﬁ scal policy in Germany and 
some other (but not all) euro area economies is con-
strained by their ﬁ scal positions and/or the Stability 
and Growth Pact, although their budgets would be 
aided somewhat if growth were to strengthen in several 
countries together.  Fiscal expansion should be possible 
in some non-euro countries with large surpluses, such 
as Sweden, Switzerland, and oil producers Norway and 
Russia.
Because of the constraints on ﬁ scal expansion, it is 
important that European countries actively encourage 
stronger growth through structural reforms, as has long 
been urged by the IMF and OECD.103  Reforms to 
increase competition in product and services markets 
can promote higher levels of consumer spending, and 
reforms that raise labor-force participation can also 
contribute to growth in incomes, consumption and 
investment.  Th ese reforms are clearly desirable for 
their own sake, even though their impact on demand 
may be oﬀ set to some degree by increases in potential 
output that diminish any reduction in current account 
surpluses.
Finally, especially in light of the limitations on ﬁ scal 
policy and the time required for structural reforms and 
their eﬀ ects, it is very important that the European 
Central Bank pursue a monetary policy that supports 
growth.  We recognize that this may place downward 
pressure on the euro that would raise current account 
surpluses, other things being equal.  Th is may be a nec-
essary price to pay for growth; it is in no one’s interest 
to return to widespread economic weakness in Europe.
Since the dollar began to fall in February 2002 the euro 
has appreciated (as of July 2007) by about 22 percent 
in real eﬀ ective terms, and by about 58 percent against 
the dollar.  However, this appreciation was eﬀ ectively 
a recovery from the sharp depreciation that occurred 
from 1999 to 2001.  Given this recent appreciation, and 
the fact that the euro area as a whole is essentially in 
current account balance, little further eﬀ ective (trade-
weighted) appreciation of the euro may be required 
for dollar adjustment, assuming that Asian currencies 
appreciate.104
However, we believe that eﬀ ective depreciation of the 
euro is undesirable, and therefore that additional appre-
ciation of the euro against the dollar will be necessary 
as other countries adjust.  Th is will be especially true 
if petro-surpluses remain very large and require more 
extensive global adjustment.  Th ere is room for the euro 
to appreciate further, because in real eﬀ ective terms the 
euro is now at the levels of the mid-1990s.  We urge 
the European authorities to refrain from intervention 
to inhibit such appreciation against the dollar.
Japan
In struggling to end deﬂ ation and emerge from its long 
economic slump, Japan drove interest rates extremely 
low and intervened actively to hold down the value of 
the yen to stimulate exports.  In the last several years, 
the Japanese economy has substantially recovered.  
Although there has not been active exchange rate 
intervention since March 2004, the yen (which at that 
time had already depreciated 15 percent in real eﬀ ective 
terms from its average in 2000) had by July 2007 de-
preciated by an additional 26 percent, notwithstanding 
the continuation of very large current account surplus-
es.  Th e yen even fell by about 11 percent against the 
declining dollar during this latter period.  Its pervasive 
weakness, in the absence of intervention, is presumably 
a response to expectations of continuing low interest 
rates (in spite of a gradual normalization of monetary 
policy), to the “carry trade” associated with these low 
rates, and to expectations of future intervention if the 
yen were to rise signiﬁ cantly.ix
Th e role of Japan in the adjustment process presents 
something of a dilemma.  It is above all essential that 
Japan be a source of growth in the Asian and global 
ix Investors in the “carry trade” borrow yen (or other currencies) at low interest rates and use the funds to invest in assets in other currencies at higher rates 
of return.  Th is involves net sales of the borrowed currency.
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economies, and employ its economic policies to that 
end.  However, a huge accumulation of government 
debt resulting from ﬁ scal expansion during the slump, 
continuing large (albeit declining) structural budget 
deﬁ cits, and an old and aging population indicate the 
need for continuing ﬁ scal consolidation.  (Indeed, the 
IMF staﬀ  has recommended an acceleration of this 
consolidation beyond that planned by the Japanese 
government.)105  Th is means that monetary policy must 
continue to support growth, even though the resulting 
low interest rates tend to hold down the value of the 
yen.  From an international perspective, rather than to 
accelerate ﬁ scal consolidation, it might be desirable to 
adjust the policy mix slightly by taking somewhat more 
gradual steps toward ﬁ scal consolidation and pursuing 
monetary normalization somewhat more aggressively.  
As in Europe, it would also be desirable to encourage 
more domestic demand, including higher consumer 
spending, by accelerating the pace of structural market 
reforms.  IMF staﬀ  work indicates that this could 
mitigate the impact of ﬁ scal consolidation in raising the 
current account surplus.106
In any case, the limitations of using macroeconomic 
policies alone for adjustment make it essential that the 
yen appreciate as part of a global adjustment process.  
Th e euro has taken a disproportionate share of adjust-
ment against the dollar since 2002.  We believe that, 
with the recent strengthening of the Japanese economy, 
a reversal of a signiﬁ cant proportion of the yen’s 2000-
to-mid-2007 37 percent real eﬀ ective depreciation – a 
real eﬀ ective appreciation of perhaps 10-20 percent – is 
appropriate.  (Th e implied appreciation against the 
dollar would be substantially larger.)  To accomplish 
this, the Japanese authorities should not intervene to 
impede appreciation or signal an intention to intervene 
in the future when the yen begins to rise.  Th is pro-
cess should be assisted by a public recognition by the 
Japanese and other authorities that such an apprecia-
tion is a welcome and necessary component of global 
adjustment.  Should the yen depreciate very greatly, 
and such “jawbone” intervention not suﬃ  ce, Japan and 
the United States should consider joint direct exchange 
rate intervention, following the course they pursued in 
1998.
China
Th e Chinese economy has experienced extraordinary 
progress in the past quarter-century, producing very 
rapid aggregate and per capita growth and an enormous 
reduction in poverty.  Although China’s growth strat-
egy has been strongly trade-oriented for many years, 
as Chinese saving has soared and the renminbi has 
depreciated with the dollar since 2002, export growth 
has substantially exceeded that of imports, generating 
large trade and current account surpluses.  In 2006 the 
latter was an extremely large 9.1 percent of GDP, and 
the trade surplus increased year-to-year by an enor-
mous 84 percent in the ﬁ rst ﬁ ve months of 2007.107  
As discussed in Part III, the surpluses are related to a 
very high saving rate, which has long been a feature of 
the Chinese economy.  Also contributing more recently 
have been the rapid incorporation of China into inter-
national production networks, with large inﬂ ows of 
FDI, and an undervaluation of the renminbi associated 
with rapid productivity growth, low inﬂ ation, and a peg 
to the dollar that has been relaxed only slightly since 
July 2005.  China’s structural characteristics have thus 
combined with its policies to produce an extremely 
export-oriented pattern of growth, characterized by 
large current and capital account surpluses and very 
rapid accumulation of reserves, which totaled some 
$1.2 trillion in early 2007.
In spite of its economic beneﬁ ts, this export-oriented 
growth has created serious problems both internation-
ally and domestically.  Internationally, it has contrib-
uted to the global imbalances and increasing trade 
tensions with both advanced and competing lower-
wage countries.  Domestically, it has suppressed con-
sumption relative to investment and exports, increased 
income disparities, reduced monetary policy control 
over an overheated economy, and distorted the com-
position of investment.108  Finally, the accumulation of 
massive reserves that earn only a fraction of the domes-
tic return to capital reﬂ ects an enormous misallocation 
of resources and economic loss to the Chinese people.
Th e Chinese authorities clearly recognize these prob-
lems, and have announced their intention to place 
more emphasis on domestic demand and consumption, 
address social and geographic income disparities, and 
allow more exchange rate “ﬂ exibility.”109  (A further 
small widening of the trading band for the renminbi 
was announced in May 2007.)  Nevertheless, while 
recognizing the diﬃ  culties in shifting economic direc-
tion in such a large, only partly market-driven economy, 
progress towards the new growth strategy has been 
very slow.110
40
We fear that protectionist sentiments in the United 
States and other higher-wage countries are rising dan-
gerously, and that the risk of instability posed by the 
international imbalances is also increasing, as China’s 
trade surplus continues to grow.  We therefore urge the 
Chinese authorities to proceed with greater urgency to 
shift policies in the directions they have indicated.  We 
recognize that such changes must be made carefully, 
given weaknesses in the ﬁ nancial system and the social 
and political requirements for continued rapid growth.  
But we believe that signiﬁ cant and visible eﬀ orts by 
China are needed to head oﬀ  the dangers we have 
described.  In particular:
• Public consumption expenditures should be ex-
panded in education, health care, public pensions, 
and other programs to improve welfare broadly 
across the population and reduce the need for 
precautionary saving.
• Higher private consumption and eﬃ  cient private 
investment should also be encouraged through 
ﬁ nancial reforms that improve the intermediation 
of private saving.  In this regard, the development 
of eﬃ  cient private domestic banks, in competi-
tion with foreign-owned banks, is critical, as is 
a modern system of supervision and prudential 
regulation.111
• Th ere should be signiﬁ cant near-term apprecia-
tion of the renminbi, in the range of perhaps 10 
percent (against the dollar) over a one-year period, 
accompanied by a wider permitted trading band to 
increase ﬂ exibility.  After an initial adjustment of 
this magnitude, we would expect to see renminbi 
appreciation in the range of 5-7 percent per year 
for several more years.  Th e real, eﬀ ective renminbi 
appreciation would be signiﬁ cantly smaller than 
that against the dollar, especially if (as we strongly 
recommend) other highly managed Asian curren-
cies are also allowed to appreciate.
• In the longer term, over a period of some ﬁ ve to 
ten years, as China vigorously pursues reforms to 
improve its ﬁ nancial system, it should continue 
gradually to liberalize its capital account; eventu-
ally it should move to a largely market-determined 
exchange rate that would prevent a reemergence of 
large external imbalances as its rapid productivity 
growth continues.
We recognize that the implementation of these policies, 
and in particular currency appreciation, would prob-
ably have a smaller impact on the U.S. current account 
deﬁ cit, and perhaps even on the Chinese surplus, than 
anticipated in public discussions in the United States 
(for the reasons noted in Section III).  However, the 
combination of policies would constitute important 
progress towards reduction of international imbalances 
and would be strongly in China’s own self-interest.
Th is acceleration of Chinese policy changes conforms 
in general to previous public recommendations by the 
IMF.112  However, we believe their timely implemen-
tation is more likely in a framework of multilateral 
discussions organized by the IMF than as a result of bi-
lateral discussions with only the United States.  In such 
a multilateral context, China can provide a powerful 
conﬁ dence-building signal that it recognizes the need 
for global adjustment and its international responsibili-
ties as a major economic power.
Petroleum Exporters
Th e extremely large and rapid increase in the trade 
and current account surpluses of the oil exporters 
during 2002-2006 ended when oil prices stopped 
rising in mid-2006, but the surpluses have remained 
large.  After oil price spikes in the past, large current 
account surpluses fell or even gave way to large deﬁ cits 
in some cases as oil prices came down and spending on 
imports increased.  Although this may happen again, 
the surpluses are now much larger in real terms than 
in previous episodes; most analysts expect relatively 
high oil prices to continue; and the imports of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries appear to be 
growing more slowly, as noted in Part III.  Th ese cur-
rent account surpluses may therefore remain unusually 
large, and the risk of even higher oil prices and larger 
surpluses continues because of the political instability 
in the Middle East.
Middle East oil exporters in general have been increas-
ing public expenditures very rapidly in the last several 
years.  Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates 
have undertaken large public-private investment 
programs in both the energy and non-energy sectors to 
increase oil production and diversify their economies.113 
Th e rate of increase in their spending is limited by the 
absorptive capacities of their economies and a prudent 
regard for the ﬁ scal uncertainties related to the future 
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of oil prices.  Th eir current expenditure policies may 
therefore be making as much of a contribution to 
global adjustment as is feasible; Saudi Arabian imports 
increased by about 40 percent in 2006, after increas-
ing by 23 percent annually on average in the preceding 
three years.114
Prior to Kuwait’s switch to a peg based on a basket of 
currencies in May 2006, the currencies of the GCC 
countries were all pegged rigidly to the dollar, both be-
cause of the need for some exchange rate anchor and in 
contemplation of a planned GCC movement to a single 
currency in 2010.  As the dollar has fallen, the peg has 
produced an anomalous eﬀ ective depreciation of these 
currencies in spite of soaring terms of trade, current 
account surpluses, and foreign asset accumulation.  
Th is has somewhat inhibited adjustment by slowing 
the growth of imports, especially because GCC imports 
have a much larger European than U.S. component, 
although the small amount of domestic production 
in these economies limits the scope for expenditure-
switching to imports.  More important, as in the case of 
China, the dollar peg has reduced the eﬀ ectiveness of 
monetary policy and made it harder to control inﬂ ation 
in these booming economies.  Th is was the reason given 
for Kuwait’s recent policy change.115
Presumably, ﬂ oating exchange rates would prove too 
volatile for these countries, but we believe some ap-
preciation would be appropriate for both domestic 
and international reasons.  While we understand the 
reluctance to expose these economies to the “Dutch 
disease” of uncompetitive overvalued exchange rates, 
this is not a strong argument for exchange rate depreci-
ation.  In fact, domestic inﬂ ation may produce eﬀ ective 
appreciation that is much harder to control.  Because 
these countries are reconsidering their currency ar-
rangements in any case, those other than Kuwait might 
consider, as their individual circumstances dictate, 
either a discrete appreciation of the dollar peg or (as 
Kuwait has done) a link to a more diversiﬁ ed currency 
basket weighted towards the euro and Asian currencies 
that reﬂ ect the composition of GCC imports.
Th ere are, of course, a number of non-Middle East oil 
exporters with large current account surpluses, such 
as Norway, Russia, Algeria, Nigeria, and Venezuela.  
Th ese countries should also allow their currencies to 
appreciate as part of the global adjustment process.
Other Surplus Countries
As noted in Part III, although the United States 
accounts for nearly two-thirds of global current ac-
count deﬁ cits, a large number of countries run current 
account surpluses, even after accounting for the large 
surpluses of the petroleum exporters, Japan, China, and 
Germany and the Netherlands within the Euro Area.  
Taken in the aggregate, these smaller surplus countries 
constitute a signiﬁ cant proportion of U.S. trade.  (For 
example, Malaysia, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Russia together 
have a larger weight in the Federal Reserve’s broad real 
dollar index than either China or Japan.)116
It is diﬃ  cult to generalize about a large group of coun-
tries, where circumstances and competing objectives 
diﬀ er widely.  However, where circumstances permit, 
these smaller countries, some of which are running 
extremely large surpluses relative to their economic 
size, also should allow their currencies to appreciate 
and attempt to raise domestic demand.  Many smaller 
surplus economies have become more dependent on 
external demand, with lower growth of investment 
and consumption, than prior to the currency crises of 
the late 1990s.  Economic, ﬁ nancial, and governance 
reforms can help raise investment rates in some of these 
countries.  Without adjustment in the smaller coun-
tries, exchange rate adjustments of the major currencies 
may be larger, and possible disruptions to output and 
employment more costly for all nations.
In East Asia, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Taiwan, and 
Singapore, like China, have maintained ﬁ xed or tightly 
managed links to the dollar, and developed large 
current account surpluses (especially relative to their 
GDPs), and extraordinarily large reserve accumula-
tions for relatively small countries.  It would be helpful 
for those countries that have tightly managed ﬂ oating 
exchange rates to allow their currencies to appreciate, 
but this is unlikely unless China does so.  Th ere is, 
therefore, a regional problem of East Asian adjust-
ment, centered on China, which provides a very strong 
rationale for multilateral consultations and coopera-
tion.  Hong Kong, which has long operated a ﬁ xed 
rate through a currency board, may, of course, wish to 
maintain that arrangement, in which case a real appre-
ciation of the currency is likely to take place ultimately 
through domestic inﬂ ation.
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Other Measures to Reduce Risk
As noted in Part IV, large and growing current account 
surpluses in recent years have given rise to an enormous 
increase in oﬃ  cial foreign exchange holdings.  At the 
same time, other currencies, and in particular the euro, 
have emerged as alternatives to the dollar in these 
oﬃ  cial portfolios.  Assets denominated in currencies 
other than the dollar are also likely to ﬁ nd a place in the 
portfolios of the national investment authorities that 
more countries with very large reserves are now using 
as a means of diversifying, and seeking higher returns 
on, their foreign asset holding.
While the currency composition of oﬃ  cial foreign ex-
change portfolios has been quite stable, and diversiﬁ ca-
tion has been limited, the potential for larger exchange 
market volatility or sudden exchange rate movements 
as a result of portfolio changes, or the rumor of such 
changes, has clearly increased.  We recommend that 
major holders of foreign exchange act to minimize such 
risks by voluntarily adhering to an international reserve 
diversiﬁ cation standard.  In accepting such a standard, 
countries would agree to (a) routinely disclose the 
currency composition of their foreign exchange port-
folios, and (b) make any adjustments of the currency 
composition of their portfolios gradually.  We believe 
the additional transparency and assurance of gradual 
adjustment provided by such a standard would inspire 
conﬁ dence and reduce the risk of disruption in the 
foreign exchange markets.117
Multilateral Consultations and a More 
Proactive IMF
Th e IMF convened multilateral consultations in 2006 
among the United States, Europe, Japan, China, and 
Saudi Arabia (with IMF staﬀ ) to address the issue of 
large international imbalances.  Th is group reported 
to the IMF’s International Monetary and Financial 
Committee (IMFC) on the outcome of its discussions 
on April 14, 2007, and each of the participants listed 
a number of policies it was pursuing, or contemplated 
pursuing, that are consistent with the overall adjust-
ment strategy that had been endorsed by the IMFC in 
September 2006.118  
Th is has been an important ﬁ rst step in developing a 
framework for multilateral consultations.  Importantly, 
the consultations were convened by the IMF, and 
the participants agreed upon a joint report.  In these 
respects the process broke new ground.119  Th e poli-
cies enumerated in the report, however, appear to be 
principally those that these governments had adopted, 
or set as general goals, prior to the consultations pro-
cess.  Th us, the United States says it will eliminate the 
budget deﬁ cit by 2012; China suggests that exchange 
rate ﬂ exibility will gradually increase; and the Euro 
Area indicates again its support for the Lisbon Strategy 
of market reforms.  Notably absent is any discussion 
of the more extensive exchange rate changes that we 
believe are necessary for adjustment.  While the devel-
opment of these multilateral consultations has been 
constructive, it is not clear that they are likely to aﬀ ect 
the policies of the participants signiﬁ cantly; in fact, the 
U.S. Treasury Secretary denied that their purpose was 
“to produce joint policy commitments”.120  Th e partici-
pants indicated no ﬁ rm intention of meeting again, but 
agreed to do so “when developments warrant.”
In spite of these consultations, the international 
economy does not currently have established, well-
functioning arrangements for multilateral cooperation 
on adjustment policies.  Under its Articles of Agreement, 
the IMF has a mandate to oversee the eﬀ ective opera-
tion of the international monetary system and the 
compliance of members with their obligations to 
pursue policies that promote international stability.  
Th e IMF exercised this mandate quite actively under 
the Bretton Woods gold-exchange standard, when the 
discipline imposed by ﬁ xed exchange rates provided 
it with considerable leverage over national policies.  
However, during the past three decades, the exchange 
rates of major currencies largely have been ﬂ oating, and 
the IMF has little power beyond that of “moral suasion” 
to aﬀ ect the policies of countries that do not need to 
borrow, in particular the large, systemically important 
economies such as the United States, Japan, China, and 
the larger European countries.
Th e IMF has long conducted “surveillance” and annual 
bilateral consultations with member countries indi-
vidually, and in the process has provided policy advice, 
including advice on systemic adjustment and stability.  
However, policy implementation depends entirely upon 
a country’s political “buy-in,” and this inevitably has 
required direct discussions and negotiations among the 
major economic powers.  Not surprisingly, therefore, 
policy coordination has emerged principally at times 
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of crisis under large-power agreements by, for instance, 
the G-10 (Smithsonian Agreement, 1971), G-5 (Plaza 
Accord, 1985), or G-7 (Louvre Agreement, 1986).  
While these political groups have acted eﬀ ectively, they 
have operated largely outside the IMF.  Th e IMF has 
not played (or been allowed to play) a major role in 
organizing international cooperation at such times of 
crisis.121
Th e IMF, through its charter, membership, and ex-
pertise, is uniquely equipped to conduct surveillance, 
organize multilateral consultations, and provide advice 
on global imbalances and similar international econom-
ic and ﬁ nancial issues.  Obviously, only governments 
can perform the task of initiating and implementing 
policies to facilitate adjustment.  But we believe the 
IMF can and should be more proactive as a catalyst for 
consultations on, and implementation of, adjustment 
policies.  Indeed, the IMF’s own Oﬃ  ce of Independent 
Evaluation recently issued an evaluation of the IMF’s 
exchange rate policy advice during 1999-2005 that 
found the “IMF’s global responsibilities were often 
perceived to be underplayed, particularly in being a 
ruthless truth-teller to the international community 
and a broker for international policy coordination.”122  
Th e evaluation found that insuﬃ  cient attention 
was given to “policy spillovers” and multilateral and 
regional perspectives in its bilateral surveillance ac-
tivities.123  Since the release of that report, the IMF’s 
Executive Board has issued a new Decision on Bilateral 
Surveillance that replaces its 1977 policy statement on 
exchange rate surveillance with a broader set of rules 
that explicitly take into account the eﬀ ect of a country’s 
economic and ﬁ nancial policies (including exchange 
rate policy) on external stability, and provides guidance 
on the type of actions that would constitute “currency 
manipulation.”124
We commend this new action by the IMF.  Th e 
Decision on Bilateral Surveillance complements the re-
cent multilateral consultations in taking initial steps to-
wards a more pro-active multilateral role.  However, for 
the IMF to play this role in a continuing and systematic 
way, it will require both leadership and vision on the 
part of the major governments systemically involved 
with the imbalances.  If a multilateral process is to 
succeed, representatives from some key countries must 
step forward as “champions,” and be willing to commit 
their governments to the consultation process and to 
implementation of the necessary adjustment policies.  
Needless to say, U.S. leadership in urging multilateral 
adjustment policies will be credible and eﬀ ective only 
if the United States implements reductions in its own 
ﬁ scal deﬁ cit.
As we have noted, the process of adjustment of the 
current large imbalances may take a long time.  In 
addition, as discussed in Part III, the ongoing and 
long-term process of globalization can be expected to 
increase the size of imbalances in both current and 
private capital accounts.  Th is is the likely result of the 
increased specialization in the trade of both goods and 
services and assets, involving both the reorganization of 
international production and portfolio diversiﬁ cation.  
Th ese larger imbalances may or may not turn out to 
be benign and reﬂ ect new international equilibria in a 
more interdependent world.  But, in any case, they will 
hold the potential for greater instability.  We therefore 
believe that a regular and ongoing process of multilater-
al surveillance and consultations, convened by the IMF, 
should be organized by the IMF and its shareholders.
Th e composition of such an ongoing “international 
consultative group,” and its relationship to the broader 
IMF membership, will have to be worked out.  Th e 
composition might change to reﬂ ect new problems and 
circumstances.  A small working group of roughly the 
size recently convened may be necessary for the core 
consultations to be eﬀ ective.  However, in order to 
produce the necessary political support, a mechanism 
that also involves the broader IMF membership and 
especially other very large emerging economies – not 
only China, but also India, Brazil, and Russia – will be 
needed.  Furthermore, although the recent consulta-
tions involved a single seat for the Euro Area, European 
governments make ﬁ scal policy decisions, so that major 
European governments will have to be involved.  It will 
not be an easy task to devise an appropriate and eﬀ ec-
tive mechanism.  However, we hope that by keeping 
the arrangements relatively ﬂ uid, the composition of 
a consultation group or groups can be separated from 
the ongoing debate about a more fundamental reform 
of IMF governance, which may require considerable 
time.125
We believe that such an ongoing multilateral consulta-
tion process would improve on current arrangements 
by making it clear that adjustment is a collective 
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enterprise, and by eﬀ ectively “rewarding” governments 
that are seen to participate in the program and con-
tribute to international stability.  Our recommenda-
tions should be seen as directional objectives, likely to 
be implemented over a period of several years, with 
some participants necessarily more constrained in 
their policy contributions than others.  Such a mul-
tilateral process will not replace bilateral discussions 
and negotiations of policy diﬀ erences, which may be 
necessary for both substantive and political reasons.  
But it may reduce some of the political diﬃ  culties and 
tensions characteristic of bilateral negotiations and the 
associated accusations, pleas, threats, and denials that 
often surround disagreement on national economic 
policies.
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Th is policy statement has examined a new phenom-
enon in the international economy, the unprecedented 
size and duration of very large imbalances between the 
current account deﬁ cits of capital importing countries 
– preeminently the United States – and the counter-
part surpluses of large capital exporters, among them 
China, Japan, Germany and the Netherlands, a number 
of other smaller Asian economies, and the fuel export-
ers.  We believe these imbalances reﬂ ect a number of 
factors.  Of primary importance are the explosion of 
ﬁ nancial globalization, with its cross-border asset trade 
and portfolio diversiﬁ cation; the structural diﬀ erences 
between low saving in the United States and high sav-
ing abroad; and policies that interfere with the market 
adjustment of these imbalances, including massive 
exchange rate intervention in China and some other 
Asian economies.
While large imbalances to some degree reﬂ ect increased 
globalization, they also create risks for the United 
States and other countries – especially when their size 
is enlarged by inappropriate policies that impede inter-
national adjustment.  One major risk is the growth of 
protectionism in the United States and other advanced 
countries, where wages are under pressure from foreign 
competition.  Another important risk is the possibility 
of “disorderly adjustment” – sharp changes in exchange 
rates, prices and interest rates, and possibly economic 
growth – that might ensue if investors failed to ﬁ nance 
ever-larger U.S. current account deﬁ cits.  Although we 
believe that an orderly market-led adjustment of the 
imbalances is the most likely outcome, we also believe it 
would be imprudent to ignore these risks.
We have therefore made recommendations for di-
rectional adjustments in policy by the United States 
VI.  Conclusion
and other countries, over the next several years, which 
would reduce these risks.  In general, this would involve 
an incremental rebalancing of global demand from 
the United States towards the rest of the world (and 
especially Asia), and measures to increase the response 
of exchange rates to market forces.  We have also 
proposed that an ongoing international consultative 
process, convened by a more pro-active IMF, would 
improve the likelihood that governments would imple-
ment such adjustments in policy.
Th e process of globalization has resulted in unparal-
leled economic growth and improved standards of 
living for people in many parts of the world.  But 
with ever-increasing divisions of labor, capital and 
specialization across countries, globalization is likely 
to continue to create imbalances from time to time 
because trade and capital ﬂ ows are not symmetrical 
among the world’s trading partners.  It is important not 
to allow these imbalances to precipitate crises through 
disorderly adjustment or to become an impediment 
to extending the beneﬁ ts of globalization as widely as 
possible.
Th e CED calls upon the leadership of the key countries 
and of multinational institutions, especially the IMF, to 
give greater attention to international imbalances and 
the risks that accompany them.  World leaders need 
to take both global and national considerations into 
account as they develop and implement policies that 
will adequately address imbalances, so that adjustments 
will be facilitated with minimum risks.  Th e CED 
believes that the adoption of these recommendations 
would improve the prospects for a well-functioning and 
prosperous global economy.
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Memoranda of Comment, Reservation or Dissent
Page 35, James Q. Riordan, with which John White has asked to be associated.
Th e report addresses critical issues and oﬀ ers many sound proposals.  Unfortunately it does not adequately deal 
with the need to increase U.S. savings – especially private savings.  Our tax system contributes to the problem 
because it favors consumption over savings.  CED’s paper, “New Tax Framework,” (restated on pages 35-37) does 
little to correct this unfortunate bias against savings.  Fundamental changes are needed.  Th e premature and double 
taxation of saving need to be ended.  Tinkering with subsidies for low income non-taxpayers will not do the job.  It 
is a minor rearrangement of the deck chairs on our savings Titanic.
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CE  Circulo de Empresarios
  Madrid, Spain
CEAL  Consejo Empresario de America Latina
  Buenos Aires, Argentina
CEDA  Committee for Economic Development of Australia
  Sydney, Australia
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CED Counterpart Organizations
Close relations exist between the Committee for Economic Development and independent, nonpolitical research 
organizations in other countries. Such counterpart groups are composed of business executives and scholars and 
have objectives similar to those of CED, which they pursue by similarly objective methods. CED cooperates with 
these organizations on research and study projects of common interest to the various countries concerned. Th is 
program has resulted in a number of joint policy statements involving such international matters as energy, assis-
tance to developing countries, and the reduction of nontariﬀ  barriers to trade.
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